Colby College

Digital Commons @ Colby
Honors Theses

Student Research

2020

The “Humanitarian Mystique:” Tracing the Rhetoric and Politics of
Aid in Southeast Asia from the Age of the Civilizing Mission to the
Present
Elizabeth M. Holland
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses
Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons

Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this
site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial
purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author.
Recommended Citation
Holland, Elizabeth M., "The “Humanitarian Mystique:” Tracing the Rhetoric and Politics of Aid in
Southeast Asia from the Age of the Civilizing Mission to the Present" (2020). Honors Theses.
Paper 999.
https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/999
This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital
Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Colby.

The “Humanitarian Mystique:”
Tracing the Rhetoric and Politics of Aid in Southeast Asia from the Age of the Civilizing
Mission to the Present

Elizabeth Holland
History
Colby College
May 2020

Dr. Arnout van der Meer, History
Dr. Danae Jacobson, History
Dr. Britt Halvorson, Anthropology

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements

4

List of Maps and Images

5

Abbreviations

6

Introduction

8

Chapter One
Conquest and Compassion: The Civilizing Mission Ideology and Theories of
Humanitarianism in Dialogue
Kipling’s Call to Action
Ideological Origins of New Imperialism
Innovation in the Colonial Era: Science, Technology, and Superiority
The “Compassion Consensus”
Infallible Heroes? Humanitarianisms of the Twentieth Century
At the Heart of Crisis: Medical Humanitarianism and the Emergency

19
21
25
27
30
34

Chapter Two
The Burden of American Benevolence: Cholera, Quarantine, and Civilizing in the
Philippine Islands
The Case of the Contaminated Cabbage
A New, Benevolent Power in the Asia-Pacific
Historiographic Challenges in the Study of U.S. Empire
Articulating the American Mission in the Archipelago
The “Scientific Ways” of American Days: Cholera Containment in Practice
“A Model Colonial Health Service”

38
42
43
51
58
66

Chapter Three
The Professional Volunteer; The Political Humanitarian: Médecins Sans Frontières and the
Birth of a “Movement” Along the Thai-Cambodian Border
“An International Synonym for Disaster and Humanitarian Concern”
68
Where Empires Fall, Nations Rise: The Post-War World Order
72
Colonization and Cold War Conflict in Cambodia
77
A Self Proclaimed Model Emergency Responder
80
Voicing a Self-Conscious Sensibility
82
The Aesthetics of Absence: Cambodia in MSF’s History
84
“Without Borders:” MSF’s Anti-Politics Politics
92
Practicing Politics on the Border
94
Searching for the Khmer Voice
97

2

Chapter Four
“Build Back Better:” The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Provision and
Performance of Care in Indonesia
An “Unprecedented” Disaster and An Unprecedented Response?
99
Historicizing Vulnverability: Aceh Province in the Twentieth Century
103
“Can American Rice Trump American Guns Across the Muslim World?”
107
The Politics of USAID
110
Performing Politics on a Global Stage
112
The Practice of Aid in Aceh: What is “Lost in Translation”?
115
“From the American People”
117
Epilogue

119

Bibliography

123

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A pandemic. A graduation lost. The economy. Zoom malfunctions. Goodbyes to friends and teachers and
college said too soon. Racing to finish my thesis this spring, I often felt unlucky. The writing was hard.
The subject matter is complex and sometimes, eerily relevant. I missed the comfort, or at least forced
focus, of the history office in Miller. Study breaks weren’t quite the same over Facetime and check-ins
with advisers over coffee an impossibility. But, arriving at the end of this seemingly interminable project,
I have started to change my mind. I just spent an entire year thinking – thinking! – about something I care
about. How many people are lucky enough to do that? And how many get to it with the support and
guidance of an incredible team?
I took Cultural Anthropology with Britt Halvorson, one of the wonderful readers of this thesis, during my
first semester at Colby. I couldn’t stop thinking about the course and made it my mission to return to
Britt’s classroom. My wish was granted this fall and I am forever grateful for the insight and intellect
Britt lent to this project.
I sowed the roots of this research during my junior semester abroad. In tutorials with Shamara Wettimuny
I watched the walls of history expand. I saw not only how to conduct historical scholarship, but how to
have fun doing it. Thank you, Shamara, for equipping me with the tools I needed to get started.
In the History Department, Danae Jacobson graciously agreed to read this mammoth project. Her keen
observations stretched and strengthened the scope of my work, and her willingness to commiserate in the
pain of writing and reassure me it would all work out were bright spots in this lengthy process.
For the advisor at the center of it all, Arnout van der Meer, words cannot express my overwhelming
gratitude. Arnout helped me bring this project to life and made sure it survived once video calls replaced
our Friday meetings. Our winding conversations about history, baking, or home science experiments
made this project, even in the most stressful times, an absolute joy. Arnout, thank you for your patience,
your candor and kindness, and the daunting, but always constructive, flare of your familiar purple pen. I
could not have asked for better teacher and mentor.
Gail Carlson always kept her door open to brainstorm and troubleshoot. The additional honors advisors,
Sarah Duff and John Turner, generously shared tips and tricks. Most importantly, they dragged the thesis
students out from our book-stuffed silos. This experience would not have been the same without Maggie,
Alyssa, and Emilie. No matter where she was with her own project, Emilie always met my exasperation
and panic with a kind, calm “same.” I am so grateful for the humor we found in exhaustion and the love
of history we share. If anyone is looking for a spectacular study of Abraham Lincoln’s foreign policy, I
have your girl!
To my roommates and friends, aren’t you all glad this is finally over? I could not have gotten through the
ups and downs of research, writing, and rewriting without Sophie, Willow, Caroline, Ingrid, and Nathalie.
You all knew when to cheer me on and when to call me home to take a break. And to Nate, who listened
to me ramble about this project for months – joining in my excitement about the parts I loved and offering
me a place to wallow in the parts I didn’t – thank you. My parents, Maryland and Steve, watched more of
this process unfurl than any of us expected. I could not have done without them and the unwavering
encouragement of my sisters, Jenny and Madeline.
I started this project with so many questions. I end it with even more. One hundred and thirty pages and
277 footnotes later, I don’t think I’ll ever look at the word humanitarianism the same again. But I
wouldn’t have it any other way.

4

MAPS AND IMAGES
Map 1. Southeast Asia

7

Map 2. Refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border, 1980

73

Figure 1. “The White Man’s Burden (Apologies to Rudyard Kipling)”

27

Figure 2. “Aligorie of communicable disease”

41

Figure 3. American sanitary inspectors

53

Figure 4. Assistant sanitary inspectors

55

Figure 5. The line pail brigade

58

Figure 6. Disinfecting cholera houses”

60

Figure 7. The burning the Farola district

61

Figure 8. Cholera detention camp, San Lazaro

62

Figure 9. “Turning Point”

66

Figure 10. “Cambodia”

87

Figure 11. USAID in Northern Sumatra

107

Figure 12. USAID brand heritage

112

Figure 13. “#BuildBackBetter”

115

5

ABBREVIATIONS
ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AICF

Action Internationale Contre le Faim

BNPB

Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana

CRASH

Centre de Réflexion sur l’Action et les Savoirs Humanitaires

DART

Disaster Assitance Response Team

DCHA

Bureau of Demcracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

GAM

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka

GCF

General Classified Files

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cresent Societies

IRC

International Rescue Committee

MSF

Médecins Sans Frontières

NACP

National Archives at College Park, Maryland

NGO

Non-governmental organization

PHS

Philippine Health Service

RBIR

Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs

OFDA

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

RG

Record Group

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

United Nations High Commission for Refugees

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

6

7

Map 1. Southeast Asia.

Legend
1. Palu, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia
2. Manila, National Capital Region,
Philippines
3. Khao-I-Dang, Sa Kaeo, Thailand
4. Banda Aceh, Aceh, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION
Palu, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 2018
On the evening of September 28, 2018, disaster struck the Indonesian province of Central
Sulawesi. A 7.4 magnitude earthquake shook the ground of this peninsula region and triggered a
powerful tsunami. Indonesian officials quickly issued tsunami warnings to residents near the
epicenter of the quake in Donggala and in the provincial capital, Palu. Unfortunately, they did
not anticipate the force with which the tsunami’s waves would soon inundate these exposed and
unprepared coastlines. The tsunami ultimately claimed over 4,000 lives in Sulawesi. An
additional 4,000 people were critically injured and over 172,000 displaced on one of the
Indonesian archipelago’s most populous islands.1 Mirroring the response to the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami, international aid poured into the region almost instantaneously. By early
October, 112 foreign humanitarian entities, including 85 international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), were active in the disaster-zone.2 The Indonesian National Board for
Disaster Management (BNPB) initially welcomed this help, but on October 9, issued a new set of
regulations for international humanitarian responders. Foreign agencies were instructed to
“retrieve their personnel immediately.”3 In an English-language notice on Twitter, the disaster
agency stated that foreign workers were no longer allowed to “go directly to the field.”4 They

1

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Emergency Plan of Action 12-month
Update, Indonesia: Earthquakes and Tsunami – Sulawesi, October 31, 2019, 2. Pdf,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MDRID013eu12m.pdf.
2
AHA Centre: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management, Situation
Update No. 12: M 7.4 Earthquake & Tsunami, Sulawesi, Indonesia, AHA Centre, October 15, 2018. Pdf,
https://ahacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AHA-Situation_Update-no12-Sulawesi-EQ-rev.pdf.
3
Kate Lyon, “Indonesia orders foreign aid workers helping with tsunami effort to leave: Disaster agency says
foreign NGOs should ‘retrieve their personnel immediately,’” Guardian, October 9, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/09/indonesia-orders-foreign-aid-workers-helping-with-tsunami-effortto-leave.
4
Rozanna Latiff and Kanupriya Kapoor, “Indonesians step up search for quake victims to beat deadline as toll
exceeds 2,000,” Reuters, October 9, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-quake/indonesia-tellsindependent-foreign-aid-workers-to-leave-quake-zone-idUSKCN1MJ0I1?il=0.

8

now had to apply to the Indonesian government for accreditation and to work exclusively
through local partners. This order shocked members of the international community. Operating
under the assumption that humanitarian work seeks only to do good and to alleviate suffering,
many Western humanitarian actors responded to this change in policy with confusion and
indignation. They could not comprehend why the Indonesian government, which had accepted
foreign aid only a decade earlier, would now rebuff their proffers of assistance.5
In response to this controversy, director of the Australian Humanitarian Advisory Group
Kate Sutton concluded: “All the assumptions we make are being overturned.”6 This “we” refers
to an imagined community of international humanitarian responders. The primary assumption
Sutton addresses is the notion that humanitarianism is inherently good, moral, and even
infallible. For many people today, humanitarianism serves as “a symbol of what is good about
the world.” By this logic, to reject assistance, as the Indonesian government did, is to reject “the
possibility of a more humane world.”7 This image of humanitarianism is attractive, and in many
ways, accurate. Yet, it does little to explain the Indonesian government’s actions in Sulawesi or
Western humanitarian actors’ response. Blinded by what political scientists Michael Barnett and
Thomas G. Weiss term the “seductive simplicity” of humanitarianism, baffled aid workers in
Sulawesi were forced to confront an uncomfortable reality: the values that define humanitarian
action are neither universal nor apolitical.8
When asked about the government’s new regulations in Sulawesi, representatives from
the Indonesian foreign affairs ministry stated that foreign actors threatened to “hamper the rescue
5

Lyon, “Indonesia orders foreign aid workers helping with tsunami effort to leave.’”
Kate Sutton in Irwin Loy, “Why Indonesia’s rules on foreign tsunami relief are rattling the aid sector,” The New
Humanitarian, October 16, 2018, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/10/16/why-indonesia-s-rulesforeign-tsunami-relief-are-rattling-aid-sector.
7
Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present,” in Humanitarianism in
Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 6.
8
Ibid., 6.
6
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and recovery work carried out by the national team.”9 This decision transformed the disasterzone into a site where the Indonesian government asserted its sense of sovereignty and national
pride. Such a display of strength and autonomy, journalists noted, was particularly important
leading up to the 2019 elections in Indonesia.10 This rejection of aid reveals an often-unspoken
truth about the relationship between humanitarianism and geopolitics: they are and have been
deeply interconnected. While members of the Western aid community could not comprehend the
Indonesian government’s motivations, the Indonesian government considered their decision a
political necessity. To understand these points of friction in the contemporary humanitarian
landscape, I argue, it is necessary to look at the past.
Historicizing Humanitarianism
We want to be relevant medically and irrelevant militarily and politically.
— Kenny Gluck, Operations Director, Doctors Without Borders, 200411
Popular conceptions of humanitarianism often fail to fully acknowledge the geopolitical
and historical context in which relief work occurs. This orientation to the present is a defining
feature of humanitarianism. Many humanitarian actors, particularly those tasked with the
provision of medical aid, view their primary objective to be the alleviation of immediate
suffering. These actors often discuss their work in the language of compassion and moral
obligation, emphasizing urgent human need above all else. This framing of humanitarianism
grants individual aid workers vital access to vulnerable populations in times of crisis. At an

9

Loy, “Why Indonesia’s rules on foreign tsunami relief are rattling the aid sector.”
Casey Quakenbush, “Indonesia Orders Independent Foreign Aid Workers to Leave Earthquake Hit Zone,” Time,
October 9, 2018, https://time.com/5419222/indonesia-foreign-aid-sulawesi-earthquake/.
11
Kenny Gluck in John S. Burnett, “In the Line of Fire,” The New York Times, August 4, 2004,
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/04/opinion/in-the-line-of-fire.html.
10
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institutional level, this discourse also promotes a narrative of humanitarian exceptionalism. The
agencies considered in this research often implied that because humanitarian action was spurred
by compassion and concern, it existed outside the realm of politics.
The 2018 controversy in Sulawesi reveals that history and politics unavoidably intersect
in the figure of humanitarianism. The Indonesian government restricted outside intervention in
the disaster-zone to signify that Indonesia was no longer subject to foreign incursion. This
decision spoke to a much longer history of colonial rule and international intervention in
Indonesia, as well as in surrounding nations in Southeast Asia. Scholars such as Michael Barnett
have suggested that modern humanitarianism is rooted in historical narratives of imposition. This
research specifically argues that humanitarianism, as both a discursive tool and code of practice,
makes visible some legacies of the ‘civilizing mission’ – the ideology used to justify colonialism
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This iteration of colonial thought was born
from European and American desires to “uplift” “uncivilized” and unkempt populations around
the world. The provision of healthcare and medicine, as this research shows, was central to this
mission. Today, medical humanitarian institutions issue many similar appeals. They strive to
allay suffering, cure disease, and help downtrodden individuals reach their full potential. I do not
suggest that all medical humanitarians are neocolonial proponents of the civilizing mission.
Rather, this research explores the humanitarian dimensions of civilizing and the civilizing
dimensions of humanitarianism. In this way, I seek to demystify what historian Michael Adas
terms the “humanitarian mystique” and to offer ways forward in a field of discourse chronically
plagued by historical amnesia.12

12

Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 200.
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A Continuum of Context-Specific Humanitarianisms
In the nineteenth century, Southeast Asia served as a crucial testing ground for competing
civilizing ideologies. The British ruled Malaya and the Straits Settlements under the mandate of
the civilizing mission. The Dutch Ethical Policy guided imperial rule in the Netherlands East
Indies, while the French pursued the mission civilisatrice in Indochina. The American
government, in the first years of the twentieth century, adopted a program of “benevolent
assimilation” in the Philippine Islands. Each of these initiatives appeared slightly different in
practice but were united by their consistent appeals to the rhetoric of an allegedly humanitarian
imperial ideology. As formal structures of empire crumbled in the wake of the Second World
War, Southeast Asia remained the subject of great international attention and concern. The Cold
War was arguably fought on physical battlefields in this expansive region, a geographic
designation first assigned by the American military in WWII. These political winds, subsequent
chapters will show, shaped the development of humanitarian thought and practice over the
course of the long twentieth century.13
Scholars Barnett and Weiss contend that the character of has humanitarianism
transformed in three historical phases over the past 150 years. They locate the origins of modern
humanitarianism in the late nineteenth century, an era defined by high imperialism and civilizing
missions. Phase two of this structure, marked by accelerated decolonization and superpower
conflict, spanned the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War. Barnett and Weiss’s third
proposed phase began in the early 1990s.14 This period, in which we currently live, is marked the

13

Historians use the “long-twentieth century” perspective to suggest that global developments in the twentieth
century are rooted in events of the late nineteenth century and continue to impact life in the twenty-first century. For
an example of scholarship that employs this approach, see Tim Harper and Sunil S. Amrith (ed.), Histories of Health
in Southeast Asia: Perspectives on the Long Twentieth Century (Indianapolis; Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2014).
14
Barnett and Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present,” 30.
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discourse of human rights and globalization. The case studies presented in the following chapters
reflect this temporal framework. There are obvious differences between the humanitarianisms of
each of these eras that should not be overlooked. However, when studied comparatively and in
context, seemingly disparate cases reveal fascinating, and sometimes uncomfortable, historical
continuities. In selecting studies from the colonial, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods, this
research illuminates some of the core ideologies and assumptions that have defined and continue
to challenge medical humanitarian work in Southeast Asia.
This project begins with a case study from the dawn of the twentieth century. After a
brief survey of the literature of the civilizing mission and humanitarianism in Chapter One,
Chapter Two examines the U.S. government’s response to an outbreak of cholera in the
Philippine Islands in 1902. In its reaction to this epidemic, the American colonial government
redeveloped and deployed an iteration of the civilizing mission that centered issues of health and
hygiene. Chapter Three, a Cold War era case study, investigates the work of Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF), Doctors Without Borders, along the Thai-Cambodian border in the 1980s.
This chapter focuses on the ways in which MSF, now an internationally renowned medical NGO,
has incorporated its experience with Khmer refugees into a unique narrative of its institutional
history. Chapter Four, situated in the contemporary phase Barnett and Weiss describe, explores
the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) response to the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami in Indonesia. This study considers how USAID, an independent agency of the
U.S. government, approached its work in the disaster-zone as an unparalleled opportunity for
humanitarian action in the twenty-first century.
Each of the institutions or organizations selected for study in this research have become
humanitarian exemplars of some kind. The U.S. government finances a massive proportion of

13

public health programs around the world, and specifically in Southeast Asia. Through powerful
and highly mobile organizations like USAID, American actors oversee expansive programs of
global humanitarian and development assistance. MSF, a fledgling organization in the early
1980s, has since emerged as a leader in the field of emergency medical intervention. In other
words, I argue that each of these institutions occupy an outsize role in the contemporary
humanitarian landscape. I have selected them for study in this research to serve as demonstrative,
rather than wholly representative, models of humanitarian thought and action in the twentieth
and twenty first centuries.
Comparing Across Time, Space, and Disciplines
This study of the link between the civilizing mission and medical humanitarianism in
Southeast Asia is an exercise in comparative history with an interdisciplinary twist. Sociologist
William H. Sewell posits that the comparative approach allows scholars to investigate “general
phenomena” and “analogous developments” using context-specific examples.15 I draw Sewell’s
logic into conversation with Barnett and Weiss’s notion of “vantage point” to include a diverse
array of source types and disciplinary perspectives in this research. I constructed the narrative of
each case study using traditional historical materials in combination with studies in political
science, anthropology, and epidemiology, official government documents, photographs, and even
contemporary web sources. Chapter Two, for example, is rooted in the archival research I
conducted in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland in January 2020. Chapters Three
and Four, based in traditional narratives of history, also draw heavily from ethnographically
oriented sources and online media campaigns. Photographs, included throughout the following

15

William H. Sewell Jr., “Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History,” History and Theory 6, no. 2 (1967):
216.
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chapters, provide additional details about the histories discussed; they often speak in ways that
text alone cannot.
Like scholars before me, I employ an interdisciplinary approach to suggest that there are
many ways of knowing and writing history. Narratives of history, this research proposes, are
only enriched by the integration of diverse viewpoints. That said, I acknowledge the limitations
of this project. Restricted to particular sources by language, geography, and time, I recognize that
many perspectives are still missing from this body of work. My writing centers the voices of
Western humanitarian institutions, and in many ways, preserves the patterns of silencing that I
critique. I seek to illuminate these chronic oversights by exploring the historical continuities
embedded in humanitarianisms of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. To do this using the
comparative method, I have formulated a core set of parameters to guide my examination of each
case study. I distill the resulting analytical rubric into three primary categories: discourse and
practice, mastery and expertise, and experimentation in the emergency.
Discourse and Practice
At the outset of this project, I intended to examine how the rhetoric of the civilizing
mission persisted in humanitarian discourses of the twentieth century. This remained among my
chief objectives and constitutes a central component of this research. However, I quickly realized
that humanitarianism is not only a rhetorical device. The language of this powerful tool, much
like the ideology of the civilizing mission, informs a unique, complex code of practice. In each
of the cases included in this research, humanitarian actors discussed their work in the language of
compassion and commitment to serving humanity. Each agency, including the American colonial
administration in the Philippines, promoted policies that recognized the importance of local
cooperation and voluntary participation in health programming. These calls for the preservation

15

of local agency were admirable, but rarely translated smoothly into practice. Humanitarian
interventions in the Philippines, Cambodian refugee camps, and in Indonesia in 2004 often
consolidated authority among foreign, Western actors, leaving little, if any, space for local input
or direction. This incongruity in humanitarian policy and practice is reminiscent of some of the
key tensions of the civilizing mission ideology. Immortalized in Rudyard Kipling’s famed poem
“The White Man’s Burden,” philosophies of civilizing promised to “uplift” colonial subjects
through instruction in Western values and practices. These policies, born of earlier iterations of
imperial thought, concurrently maintained that colonial subjects would never attain status equal
to that of their colonizers. Such rhetoric reaffirmed the notion that colonial agents knew better
than their indigenous subjects and were therefore justified in implementing coercive systems of
practice. This paradox – of what is said versus what is done – persists in the contemporary
humanitarian system and often manifests in the discourse of expertise.
Mastery and Expertise
The civilizing mission ideology was based on an assumption of superiority. European and
American colonial actors, as Chapter One discusses, believed that advancements in the realms of
culture, science, and technology signified a mastery of the material and natural world. The ability
and willingness to fight disease in the colonial arena testified not only to the benevolent
character of a colonial administration, but to its advanced status and masterful sensibility. Many
of the humanitarian organizations considered in this study shared in similar convictions. Their
policies often reflected a presumption that advanced understandings of Western science and
medicine justified intervention in unfamiliar contexts. These views were not entirely unfounded,
but often reflected the notion that humanitarian ideals, as well as visions of modernity and
progress, were shared universally. The humanitarian agencies discussed in this research often

16

narrated their role in relief work in terms of expertise. The provision of care testified to material
capacity and operational capability, as well as to a commitment to care for communities in need.
This humanitarian preoccupation with expertise, much like ideology of the civilizing mission,
bathed sentiments of mastery and superiority in the discourse of compassion. Crises, the
following chapters will show, provided exceptional opportunities for the construction and
cultivation of new, expert humanitarian sensibilities.
Experimentation in the Emergency
Humanitarian crises opened discursive and geographic spaces in which intervening
institutions could articulate a unique humanitarian identity. Historian Warwick Anderson
describes the Philippine archipelago under American colonial occupation as a “laboratory of
hygiene and modernity.”16 I apply Anderson’s concept of the “laboratory,” and its connotations
with experimentation, to the case studies in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras as well. Each
chapter explores how the geopolitical context surrounding a particular disaster shaped the
humanitarian response. In the Philippine Islands, the outbreak of cholera presented the unstable
American administration an opportunity to distinguish itself from the previous Spanish colonial
regime. Intervention in the name of health and hygiene testified to the caring nature of the U.S.
government. In the 1980s, MSF intervened in refugee camps nested along the border of Thailand
and Cambodia. Contemporary representations of this experience have retroactively fashioned
these camps as “laboratories” in which an institutional identity premised on professionalism and
expertise was born. In the twenty-first century, USAID arrived in the Indonesian tsunami
disaster-zone to show the world that American generosity was still alive and a viable vehicle of
diplomacy.

16

Warick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 5.
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This research historicizes humanitarianism not to critique or condemn it, but to
understand it as flawed creature that straddles the line between a present, life-affirming mission
and perhaps unsavory colonial past. In dissecting the historic connection between
humanitarianism and the civilizing mission, this study offers tools to help contemporary
humanitarian actors contextualize their work in broader historical narratives. I do not intend to
judge vilify or past or present medical humanitarian actors and institutions. I greatly respect the
hard, conscientious work that organizations like MSF and USAID carry out in service of others.
My decision to focus on institutions, rather than individual actors, harkens again to the issue of
“vantage point.” As stated previously, this study does not capture all perspectives and does not
claim to. Instead, I have attempted to illuminate some of the salient patterns that emerge in
institutional representations of relief work and build on the robust conversations that many relief
agencies and individual aid workers are already having.
This project was primarily born from my own admiration and curiosity. I raise critical
questions in subsequent chapters to understand how humanitarian organizations have historically
made sense of their positioning in contested spaces and in a complex tradition. The knowledge
gathered here, I hope, will allow future scholars to recognize and reject the teleological
tendencies that persist in contemporary discourses of aid and intervention. In this way, we can
learn to celebrate the contributions that humanitarian actors make to populations in distress,
while also acknowledging uncomfortable histories of inequality and silencing that may lie
beneath the surface.

18

CHAPTER ONE
Conquest and Compassion:
The Civilizing Mission Ideology and Theories of Humanitarianism in Dialogue
Kipling’s Call to Action in Southeast Asia
Take up the White man’s burden –
The savage wars of peace –
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to nought.17
In the 1899 poem “The White Man’s Burden,” British novelist and poet Rudyard Kipling
exhorted the American government to assume the onerous task of administering empire in
Southeast Asia.18 The United States seized control of the Philippines in the 1898 SpanishAmerican War, though a nascent Filipino government and robust resistance movement struggled
against the imposition of American dominance. This nationalist conflict, now recognized as the
Philippine-American War, ended in the official American occupation of the Philippine Islands
until 1946. Originally subtitled “The United States and the Philippines,” Kipling’s work intended
to guide the American government in its imperial pursuits. In seven verses which each begin
with the rallying call “Take up the White Man’s Burden,” Kipling delineated his understanding
of the requirements of modern imperial rule. From its title alone, this famed poem encapsulates
two definitive characteristics of late nineteenth century imperialism. First, the specification of the
“White Man” highlights racial and gendered distinction, imbued with an assumption of

17

Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden, 1899,” Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University, accessed
November 16, 2019, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/Kipling.asp.
18
Ibid.

19

superiority, as a key component of colonial ideology. Second, the notion of a “burden” offered
traditional expressions of empire a new lexicon and renewed appeal. Imperialism was no longer
a simple exercise in conquest and domination but a uniquely masculine expression of obligation
and even benevolence. This logic formed the foundation of what historians Tony Ballantyne and
Antoinette Burton term a “new imperialism.”19 Born of older imperial orders, this nineteenth and
twentieth century iteration of imperialism was neatly packaged in a new appealing form: the
civilizing mission.
Under the mandate of the civilizing mission, the ambitious imperial state sought to not
only rule and exploit, but to ‘civilize’ the inhabitants of its colonies. “The White Man’s Burden”
proposed mechanisms by which the Americans could “uplift” native residents of the Philippines,
a population Kipling reductively described as “new-caught, sullen peoples, half-devil and halfchild.”20 To undertake this taxing project, Kipling instructed the Americans “To send forth the
best ye breed…To serve your captives’ need.” As the epigraph included above indicates, this
“need” referred specifically to issues of local health, disease, and wellbeing. For the
contemporary observer, the preoccupation with filling “the mouth of Famine” and bidding “the
sickness cease” casts colonial actions in a kindhearted, almost humanitarian light.21 Coated in the
veneer of concern, compassion, and civilizing, this vision of imperialism permeated American
public works and public health projects in the Philippines at the dawn of the twentieth century.
This research argues that some principles of the civilizing mission – namely international
intervention in the name of relief and health aid – endured in medical humanitarian missions in
the twentieth century, even as explicit references to empire became taboo. To understand this
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connection, as well as the historic and contemporary international humanitarian system, it is
necessary to begin with a survey of the civilizing mission literature.
Ideological Origins of New Imperialism
A key feature of imperial discourse in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
‘civilizing mission’ often elides precise definition. In the 1989 publication Machines as the
Measure of Man, historian Michael Adas laments a historic failure to consider the civilizing
mission as a codified ideology. In the postcolonial era, he argues, scholars frequently dismissed
this concept as a reflection of the “Victorian capacity for self-righteous rationalization and
naïveté,” rather than as a serious set of shared principles worth identifying.22 Historian Alice L.
Conklin, in a study of French West Africa 1895-1930, argues that the mission civilisatrice could
be read as the “official ideology” of imperialism in the French Third Republic. Each European,
and later American, empire described analogous civilizing policies in its own terms. The nuances
of these competing discourses, as discussed previously, may explain the historic reluctance to
treat the civilizing mission as a distinct ideology. These variations in rhetoric likely also
illuminate key differences between practices of civilizing in different imperial states.
Nevertheless, at the core of each of these parallel ideologies was conviction of superiority.
Civilizing discourse offered a way to explains Europeans’ alleged advancement relative
to “African backwardness or Asian stagnation.”23 Both Adas and Conklin concede that the
assumption of superiority constituted a cornerstone of this imperial dogma, but the two historians
offer different explanations as to why Europeans believed themselves superior to the rest of the
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world.24 For Adas, European hubris derived from a self-serving belief that Western technological
and scientific innovation signified elite status. Conklin proposes that a sense of cultural
attainment in terms of political philosophy, for example, justified the spread of French values
and knowledge worldwide. The aforementioned variations in civilizing ideologies may explain
the nuances of these arguments. As anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler explains, it is crucial to
recognize that imperial endeavors took many forms and empire is not a static, or homogenous
designation.25 Adas and Conklin do seem to agree that the civilizing mission relied upon what
historian Catherine Hall terms a continuous and vigilant negotiation of a “grammar of
difference.”26 In defining this difference, imperial actors positioned themselves as the rightful
bearers of a civilizing burden.
Late nineteenth century imperial discourse articulated difference through theories of
“cultural differentialism” and “biological racism.”27 Historian Stuart Hall argues that these
schools of thought worked in tandem; together, they constituted “racism’s two registers” and
helped harden racial and social hierarchies.28 Frances Gouda, in a history of Dutch colonialism,
contends that social theorists of the late nineteenth century, such as Herbert Spencer, vulgarized
Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theories and new findings in the biological sciences. Scholars
reframed the “evolutionary past” to suggest that “all history displayed an inherent teleology.”29
In doing so, they portrayed White European dominance as a historic inevitability. The impact of
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this cultural work is visible in the concept of mastery, a key component of the civilizing mission.
In nineteenth century French colonial policy to be ‘civilized’ was to have triumphed over tyranny
and to have advanced in political, social, and material capacities. Because the French deemed
themselves successful in battles of “despotism over liberty,” “ignorance over knowledge,” and
even “disease over health,” they felt it both their right and duty to “civilize” the “inferior”
residents of West Africa and later, Indochina.30
Conklin represents the civilizing mission as an ideology premised on belief in an alleged
universal vision of civilization. These visions, not unlike to those enshrined in twentieth century
resolutions like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were almost exclusively Western in
origin and bias. They often evolved from Christian missionary traditions of previous centuries.
Catherine Hall notes that the universalizing rhetoric of the civilizing mission echoed sentiments
of “Christian universalism” that has and continues to define religious missionary and faith-based
humanitarian activity.31 Constructs of civilization in the age of new imperialism maintained
racial and gender hierarchies which placed male Europeans, and later Americans, at the top.
Within these late nineteenth century social orders, Western traditions and values, such as
“rationality, precision, and foresight,” predominated.32 The French, for example, claimed that
their definition of civilized life, if properly spread and practiced, was capable of uplifting and
“winning over from savagery all peoples and nations.”33 This “uplift,” a fixture in civilizing
discourse, would notably never place the colonizing actor and colonized subject on equal
footing. Rather, it was an attractive phrase to signify the generosity and inherent superiority of
the civilizing agent.
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The self-serving nature of the civilizing mission ideology, and humanitarianism to some
extent, speaks to Edward Said’s concept of orientalism. In his seminal and extensively debated
contribution to postcolonial theory, Said defines ‘orientalism,’ as a “style of thought based upon
an epistemological and ontological distinction” between the “Orient” and the “Occident.” “A
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient,” Said’s
orientalism manifests in discourse.34 Systems of power and inequality, he suggests, persist in
rhetoric and endure as long as scholars and historians continue to write about the “Orient” from
their distant vantage points. I remain cognizant of these issues of perspective and positionality. I
recognize that one of the great limitations of this research is that in focusing on Western
humanitarian institutions, I inevitably create space for these dominant narratives and not others.
Said’s scholarship draws primarily from studies of European empire in South Asia,
though it illuminates key features of American imperialism in Southeast Asia as well. As an
analytic tool, orientalism provides a lens through which modern scholars may see that the Orient,
a vague designation for regions unfamiliar to the European colonial mind, existed primarily in
the Western imagination.35 Historian Dane Kennedy suggests that doctrines of imperialism,
including the civilizing mission in the nineteenth century, reveal more about “the West’s efforts
to impose itself on the peoples and cultures who came under its hegemonic sway” than colonial
subjects themselves. To this end, “the Orientalist’s presence,” Said writes, “is enabled by the
Orient’s effective absence.”36 In examining this absence, subsequent chapters investigate how an
imperialistic pattern of silencing endured beyond the age of empire. The void Said describes
presented Western institutions with abundant opportunities to define difference on their own
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terms. Colonial actors, for example, could articulate histories in which they were the heroes and
the trappings of modernity their accomplices.
Innovation in the Colonial Era: Science, Technology, and Superiority
In his study of the civilizing mission and the Great War, Michael Adas discusses Western
dogmas of dominance in terms of science and technology. Notions racial fixity and biological
determinism did not disappear but were supplemented with new theories of superiority in the late
nineteenth century. The resulting preoccupation with “uplift” stemmed from a European
conviction that innovation in science and technology signified a “mastery of the material
world.”37 Scholars from across the political and social spectrum shared in the idea that their
understanding of the “workings of the physical world and an ability to tap its resources” were far
greater than any other population in history. Military power, transportation systems, industrial
machinery, and new knowledge about health and medicine testified to Europeans’ alleged
“inventive and inquisitive” nature.38 Europeans, and later Americans, interpreted a “mastery of
disease,” made possible through modern developments in hygiene and sanitation, as
confirmation of their exceptional status.39 This conviction translated into the sense of
“righteousness, self-assurance, and higher purpose” encapsulated in the civilizing mission, and I
argue, later expressions of humanitarianism.40 Making little mention of desires for territorial
expansion or natural resource collection, the civilizing mission rationalized European hegemony
while framing conquest as an ethical mandate and global responsibility.
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The civilizing mission was shrouded in what Adas calls a “humanitarian mystique”
despite its rootedness in the discourse of imperial domination.41 This ideology, paradoxical in
nature, was a tool of subjugation and justification in a seemingly new, benevolent system of
empire. Emphasizing the need for “uplift,” the civilizing mission infantilized, gendered, and
racialized indigenous subjects. It placed the Western imperial actor in the privileged position of
caretaker and teacher, tempering despotic associations with traditional forms of colonial rule. An
1899 political cartoon entitled “The White Man’s Burden (Apologies to Rudyard Kipling)”
translated these concepts into visual form (Figure 1). The image, published in Judge magazine,
pictures Uncle Sam in the foreground. He carries garish caricatures of old and new subjects of
the U.S. Empire labeled “Filipino,” “Cuba,” “Porto Rico,” “Hawaii,” and “Samoa.” John Bull,
the American icon’s British counterpart, transports subjects from throughout the British
Empire.42 The two men race to the mountaintop of “Civilization,” pictured holding two signs,
“Education” and “Liberty,” atop stones of “Oppression,” “Barbarism,” and “Ignorance.” These
are not quite the positive attributes of Western civilization that European and American
imperialists cherished. On Uncle Sam’s body burdened by the task of civilizing, the cartoonist,
Victor Gillam, notably included a patch with a red cross. A symbol with medical humanitarian
connotations by this time, this detail raises key questions about the tenuous, but critical link
between the new imperialism of the civilizing era and humanitarianism at the dawn of the
twentieth century.43
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Figure 1. “The White Man’s Burden (Apologies to Rudyard Kipling),” 1899. 44

The “Compassion Consensus”
In contemporary Western popular culture, humanitarian action is the ultimate expression
of altruism. The archetypal humanitarian actor, driven by compassion and a sense of moral
obligation, dedicates their resources and attention to the alleviation of others’ suffering. This
narrative constitutes a core component of the international aid mission. In Empire of Humanity, a
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comprehensive study from 2011, Michael Barnett proposes that this stylized humanitarian
identity creates and sustains the narrative that humanitarianism is “civilized, humane, and
good.”45 Using this provocative language, Barnett implies that much like the ideology of the
civilizing mission, expressions of humanitarianism arguably reveal more about the providers of
aid than the recipients of it. In this view, to celebrate humanitarianism is to celebrate a world
comprised of caring and generous individuals.
Barnett identifies impartiality, neutrality, and independence as the three basic principles
of humanitarian virtue.46 Under these mandates, humanitarianism claims to divorce itself from
the realm of geopolitics and emphasizes “universal visions of humanity.”47 Though these
“universal” constructs of humanity are informed by Western biases, such attractive appeals
reaffirm the association of humanitarianism with charity and compassion rather than with
partisanship or prejudice. In a globalized world, such transcendence grants humanitarian actors
access to communities in distress, but obscures the political and historical trends that inform their
work. Speaking to this delicate balance, Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss caution that
humanitarian action may be interpreted quite differently depending on one’s “vantage point.”48
As the case in Central Sulawesi in 2018 indicated, what appears as magnanimous giving for
some may seem like imposition and incursion to others.
This research historicizes humanitarianism to understand the assumptions which underlie
its affective appeal. Popular notions of humanitarianism often place a premium on moral virtue.
This discourse of morality is projected onto relief work to depict it as something which cuts
across time and space. Compassion, a defining feature of the humanitarian mission, embodies
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these expectations. In On Revolution, philosopher Hannah Arendt proclaims that “History tells us
that it is by no means a matter of course for the spectacle of misery to move men to pity.”49 That
is to say, an empathetic response to the suffering of others is neither natural nor a historical fact.
According to Arendt, it is the product of a “passion for compassion” that developed in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the acceleration of globalization. During this time, as
Adas suggests, Western societies grew increasingly interested and able to provide welfare
services at home and abroad.50 The civilizing mission and humanitarianism are arguably twin
outgrowths of this trend.
In the age of new imperialism, colonial powers undertook the task of civilizing to present
an image of modernity and benevolence before their subjects and the world. Today, Barnett
argues, the international community tasks humanitarianism with similarly lofty goals. In this
view, the treatment of the world’s most vulnerable populations functions as a symbol of “moral
progress,” or lack thereof.51 The supposedly altruistic endeavors of the civilizing mission are
rendered nearly untenable by its overt association with empire, yet humanitarianism remains
more challenging to critique. Didier Fassin, an anthropologist and former vice-president of the
French contingent of MSF, proposes that critiquing humanitarianism threaten to disrupt the
“compassion consensus” that surrounds it.52 To suggest that humanitarian actors do not operate
with solely altruistic motives destabilizes the conviction that they are “above suspicion” because
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they act on behalf of marginalized groups.53 This acknowledgment raises the fear that
humanitarianism must relinquish the title of “moral hero of our time.”54
Infallible Heroes? Humanitarianisms of the Twentieth Century
Using a historical approach, I concurrently challenge conventional representations of
humanitarianism and recognize the virtues of historic and contemporary aid programs. To
address the “historical amnesia” that plagues the contemporary field of humanitarianism, Barnett
instructs scholars to examine the “lived ethics” of aid organizations.55 Analysis of both the
theoretical and practical underpinnings of humanitarianism reveal a complex, flawed system.
Like Barnett in Empire of Humanity, this research focuses primarily on Western, secular
humanitarian institutions. While visions of Christian universalism informed projects of
civilizing, faith-based aid networks often differ from their secular counterparts in structure and
messaging. Still, some scholars argue that humanitarians are a new type of missionary. Historian
Anne Foster, for example, describes American humanitarian actors in the Philippines working
with the Rockefeller Foundation as “secular missionaries” who spread American values
alongside Western healthcare in the early twentieth century.56
Taking a long view of the twentieth century, Barnett describes three historical phases that
reflect discursive and practical changes to humanitarianism since the colonial era. Characterized
by “colonialism, commerce, and civilizing missions,” the age of Imperial Humanitarianism
began in the early nineteenth century. After the Second World War, this period in which empires
predominated gave way to the era of Neo-Humanitarianism. Influenced by rapid decolonization
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and the rise of a neocolonial world order, this iteration of philanthropic thought addressed
questions of nationalism, sovereignty, and international development. Consideration of these
particular issues was diffuse in humanitarian rhetoric until the end of the Cold War. The third
phase Barnett recognizes is that of Liberal Humanitarianism. Beginning in the late twentieth
century, this philosophy describes aid work in the language of “liberal peace, globalization, and
human rights.” Barnett associates these features with contemporary humanitarianism as well.57
This system of periodization does not suggest that humanitarianism evolved in bounded stages.
Rather, it allows this research to show how shifting geopolitical circumstances have historically
influenced patterns of international aid provision.
As Barnett’s framework indicates, expressions of humanitarianism are highly-context
dependent. This research employs a comparative approach to recognize both the divergences
between and continuities in a range of humanitarianisms from the twentieth century. Barnett
relates Imperial, Neo-, and Liberal Humanitarianism through the figure of paternalism. This
gendered concept, evocative of Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” makes visible the paradoxes of
“emancipation and domination” historically present in humanitarian work. Beginning in the
nineteenth century, the international humanitarian community has assumed that aid workers can
and should to direct victims on “the road of progress.”58 In Paternalism Beyond Borders, Barnett
do not offer a wholehearted condemnation of this interventionist logic. Rather than denounce
paternalism as a simple restriction of local autonomy, he offers a more nuanced definition. A
“composite of care and control,” Barnett’s paternalism reveals “how power is implicated in
relations of care.”59
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My own research recognizes and expands on Barnett’s argument. Paternalism
undoubtedly exerts a strong influence on global humanitarian thought and rhetoric. I argue that
secular, Western humanitarian missions in the twentieth century were related to each other, and
to the civilizing mission ideology, by two additional factors. The first is a preoccupation with
mastery, often discussed in both imperial and humanitarian realms in terms of technological and
scientific expertise. In the literature on the civilizing mission, Adas and Conklin contend that
mastery of disease and effective health promotion conferred a sense of authority unto colonial
administrators. I propose that a parallel, though distinct dynamic emerged in twentieth century
humanitarian projects. Many scholars recognize that the colony functioned as a testing ground
for imperial power, a type of “laboratory” used in experiments of colonial control. Humanitarian
crises provided similar opportunities for experimentation. Societal disruptions due to disease
outbreak or natural disaster opened new spaces in which humanitarian agencies constructed
unique institutional identities. Discussed in the language of compassion, effective humanitarian
responses testified to the kind character and expert capability of a given organization. This moral
appeal suggests that humanitarian concern reaches across time and space, much like the universal
images of civilization described in the civilizing mission.
The moral framing of humanitarianism theoretically transcends political limitation.
Political crises often precipitate humanitarian responses, but simplistic narratives of aid work
frequently fail to acknowledge the context in which this work occurs. This pattern of chronic
forgetting simultaneously enables and problematizes modern humanitarian work.
Humanitarianism, Barnett explains, is a particular kind of politics that relies on an apolitical
projection.60 This projection grants aid agencies vital access to populations without being
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perceived as a political threat. Yet, as the case in Sulawesi showed, to assume that humanitarian
intervention exists entirely outside of political influence is inappropriate. American international
healthcare programs from the Cold War era illustrate this point well. In “The Politics of Global
Aid,” political scientist Celina Su and health policy scholar Peter Muennig draw attention to the
American use of “hearts and minds” campaigns in the aftermath of the Second World War. Born
from fears about national security and economic strength, these projects sought to secure not
only political loyalty, but also emotional and intellectual allegiance to the United States through
the provision of healthcare.61 A manifestation of Neo-Humanitarianism, these campaigns
exhibited characteristics from different those associated with Imperial Humanitarianism, though
strong colonial echoes lingered. The civilizing mission promoted “uplift” through modern
science and technology but was ostensibly a way to justify imperial expansion – a political goal –
with a humanitarian visage. Emphasis on health and wellbeing was crucial to these parallel
processes of apoliticization, and sentiments of paternalism and mastery continued to intersect in
discourses of health and disease in the twentieth century. Consequently, this research focuses on
medical humanitarianism as a particularly revealing category of aid and relief work.

61

Peter Muennig and Celina Su, “The Politics of Global Aid,” in Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health, ed.
Richard G. Parker and Marni Sommer (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 283-4.

33

At the Heart of Crisis: Medical Humanitarianism and the Emergency
Medical humanitarianism appeals to many of the attractive assumptions of
humanitarianism as a broader field. Historically oriented anthropologist Britt Halvorson argues
that aid organizations tend to narrate their work in ways that “build upon the moral appeal and
universalizing dimensions of medical humanitarianism.” They may frame the provision of
Western biomedicine as “a compassionate and humane act” rather than as an “overtly
politicized” intervention.62 This discourse centers immediate biological need at the expense of
historical accuracy. This research calls particular attention to the relationship between
contemporary medical humanitarian practice and colonial medicine. In Mixed Medicines, a
history of health in French colonial Cambodia, historian Sokhieng Au describes two major trends
in existing studies of colonial medicine. Scholars traditionally describe medicine in colonial
contexts as either a “tool of empire” or as a “diffusion of or supplement to the development of
European medicine.”63 Colonial administrations often deployed health campaigns in hierarchical,
coercive manners; past histories represent these efforts to provide Western medicine as indicative
of ignorance and lack of “true concern” for indigenous populations.64 In contrast, newer histories
informed by postcolonial theory highlight the bi-directionality of imperial relations. In Au’s
words, indigenous populations were “neither haplessly exploited guinea pigs nor proof of
colonialism’s positive effects.”65 The demographic and cultural impacts of colonial medical
projects, much like humanitarian endeavors, were perceived quite differently based on vantage
point. Neither solely an expression of benevolence, nor simply a tool of exploitation, colonial
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medicine produced much of the technology and knowledge that informs the modern medical
humanitarian system.
Like colonial medicine, medical humanitarianism has and continues to exist in many
diverse forms. Founding member and former president of MSF Rony Brauman describes
“heterogeneity” as a “defining characteristic” of medical humanitarianism. Brauman defines
humanitarian medicine “not by a particular set of techniques but by the setting in which the
action takes place and the stated aim of those involved.”66 Barnett makes a similar distinction
using two categories: emergency and alchemical humanitarianism. In theory, emergency
humanitarianism seeks primarily to create spaces of sanctuary in the short-term. A forceful
orientation to the present distances humanitarian actors from politics and mitigates the risk of
appearing overly paternalistic. Alchemical humanitarianism supposedly takes a more politically
savvy approach and employs the discourse of relief and development to address root causes of
suffering. 67
In practice, these two separate strands of humanitarian thought are nearly impossible to
separate. According to Barnett, emergency humanitarianism has historically constituted the
“industry standard.”68 It relies on the language of crisis and response to frame humanitarian
action as an immediate imperative. This focus on the present is evident in the case studies
included in this research. However, these studies also reveal that the “emergency” often
precipitates longer term occupation or intervention, the domain of alchemical humanitarianism
and many colonial projects of civilizing. Under these circumstances, the concept of the “crisis” is
a more useful tool in understanding the temporal implications of emergency response.
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Based on field work conducted with MSF, anthropologist Peter Redfield defines the
“crisis” as “a general sense of rupture” that transforms the quotidian into the calamitous.
Episodes of disaster and conflict, Redfield submits, often constitute “narrative turning points.”
Though crises are assumed to possess an ephemeral quality, they become historical events which
“mark time indelibly yet stand outside it in a state of exception.”69 This state of exception is a
reference to the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power
and Bare Life, Agamben proposes that the prototypical emergency produces a “state of
exception.” Agamben developed this theory of exceptionalism in the reference to twentiethcentury refugee camps. He treats the theoretical camp as a spatialized response to crisis that
constitutes an “absolute space of exception [italics added].” 70 A site of “inclusive exclusion,”
Agamben’s camp is consistently inconsistent. The refugee camp, like the crisis, exists outside of
and defines the norm. In this research, I extend Agamben’s notion of exceptionalism to disaster
zones more broadly. Crises, I argue, function as experimental spaces that serve both political and
humanitarian purposes. They are laboratories in which aid organizations experiment with not
only the practice of humanitarian medicine, but also the production of new narratives and
identities.
Contemporary humanitarianism must strike a delicate balance its association with a
colonial past and forceful orientation to the present. To construct a nuanced image of historic and
contemporary medical humanitarianism, I mirror Halvorson’s approach to consider how
forgetting, a key step in the creation of seductively simplistic narratives, becomes “culturally
patterned” to support “the formation of a humanitarian identity in the present time.”71 In this
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way, this research begins to deconstruct one-dimensional, one-sided versions of humanitarian
history. In place of these narratives, I offer a continuum of context-specific humanitarianisms
which make visible in their rhetoric and practice the field’s genesis in the discourse of the
civilizing mission.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Burden of American Benevolence:
Cholera, Quarantine, and Civilizing in the Philippine Islands
Manila, The Philippines, 1902
The Case of the Contaminated Cabbage
At approximately 2:30 P.M. on March 20, 1902, the Bureau of Health for the Philippine
Islands identified its first case of cholera in Manila. By midnight, American colonial officials
confirmed four more infections. One week later, Charles Lynch, an American military surgeon
enlisted in the U.S. Volunteers, tallied 63 cases and 48 deaths from cholera in the capital. The
Farola barrio, which Lynch characterized as a “typical plague spot” due to its lack of sanitation
infrastructure, was the first site of infection.72 Cholera quickly exploded beyond the bounds of
this poverty-stricken quarter to claim victims from all strata of society. American military and
civilian health personnel frantically tried to pinpoint the origins of the outbreak. On April 11,
1902, Lynch wrote to his superiors that “Exactly by what route the present epidemic entered
Manila is not known.”73 Lynch recognized that cholera may have arrived via smuggled goods,
people, or legal visitors with latent infections. His contemporaries favored, and repeatedly
reproduced, a more elaborate theory. On March 5, 1902, Dr. Victor G. Heiser, the chief
quarantine officer and later Director of Health in the Philippines, barred the import of goods
from Canton and the British port of Hong Kong after receiving reports of cholera in Southern
China.74 In response, Chinese ships purportedly dumped their cargo into the Manila harbor.

72

Major Charles Lynch, Surgeon, U.S. Volunteers, to Headquarters Division of the Philippines Circular No. 24,
Manila, P.I., April 11, 1902; 4981-5, p. 5; Box 396; General Classified Files (GCF), 1898-1945 (1898-1913);
Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (RBIA), Record Group (RG) 350; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD (NACP).
73
Ibid., 5.
74
Anderson, Colonial Pathologies, 63.

38

Allegedly, filipinos living near the waterfront consumed contaminated green vegetables,
including cabbage and reintroduced cholera to the archipelago.
Asiatic cholera, the moniker assigned to the affliction in this region of the world, had
visited the Philippine Islands on numerous occasions prior to 1902. According to the present-day
Philippine Department of Health, the first recorded outbreak of cholera occurred in 1583 under
Spanish rule.75 In 1922, L. Lopez Rizal, the Assistant Chief Statistician and Consulting
Epidemiologist in the Public Health Service, listed twelve confirmed cholera epidemics in the
islands between 1817 and 1890. He described a “large number of cases” in the years leading up
to the “change in sovereignty of the Islands in 1898” and thirteen additional outbreaks during the
American occupation after that of 1902 to 1904.76 If Lopez Rizal portrays cholera as a wellrecognized affliction in the history of the archipelago, modern scholars must ask: why was the
epidemic of 1902 to 1904 significant?
In a survey of nearly 500 years of health, the Philippines Department of Health labels the
1902-1904 cholera outbreak the “worst epidemic in Philippine history.”77 American records,
with a statistical precision characteristic of colonial administrations of the period, reported 5,581
cholera cases and 4,386 deaths in Manila and more than 150,000 cases and 100,000 deaths in the
surrounding provinces.78 However, the impact of this epidemic was not solely demographic. In
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1902, the Philippine Islands constituted a new and vulnerable acquisition in the expanding
American empire in the Asia-Pacific. When the epidemic struck in March, the U.S. military had
recently initiated a transfer of power to American civil authorities in the islands, though
American forces still engaged in frequent, bitter conflict with Philippine insurrectos, or local
nationalist resistance fighters. Cholera arrived in the Philippines at a critical moment for the
American colonial administration. The 1902 epidemic, according to Bureau of Government
Laboratories director Dr. Richard P. Strong, “brought forcibly before [the Americans] the
particular difficulties the particular difficulties encountered in combating and controlling a
disease of this nature in a tropical country and among a partly uneducated people.”79
In their response to cholera, the American government seized upon an opportunity to
answer Rudyard Kipling’s calls lain out in the “White Man’s Burden.” The Americans sought
not only to “bid the sickness cease” as Kipling instructed, but to project an image of virility and
capability in doing so. An image of the parade float entitled “Aligorie of communicable
diseases” from this time captures the masculine, militaristic character of this American iteration
of the civilizing mission (Figure 2). On this public display, the embodiment of the Philippine
Health Service, presumably a Western man, stands poised to liberate a woman and a child,
infantilized and gendered portrayals of locals, from the clutches of diseases. In vanquishing these
plagues and publicizing this paternalistic narrative, the American actors framed the U.S.
administration as the exceptional bearer of an almost humanitarian burden.
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Figure 2. “Aligorie communicable diseases.”80

In 1902, the cholera-stricken Philippine Islands emerged as a new testing ground for the
American iteration of the civilizing mission in Southeast Asia. I submit that the outbreak
transformed the archipelago, in the words of historian Warwick Anderson, into a living
“laboratory of hygiene and modernity.”81 The American cholera response, an outgrowth of the
larger project of civilizing in the islands, was an exercise in “uplift” of supposedly needy,
“childlike” populations. The epidemic created physical and discursive spaces in which American
authorities constructed a claim to authority and testified to the benevolent nature of their
occupation. The deployment of modern scientific measures against cholera intended to
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corroborate American narratives of medico-sanitary mastery. In providing healthcare, the
American administration also capitalized on the chance to perform its generosity before its new
subjects and the world. This dual mandate sowed discord between the rhetoric of American
intervention and the practice of cholera containment. To this end, many American actors
recognized the agency of Filipino subjects but silenced their voices in favor of authoritarian
tactics with unforeseen negative consequences. This puzzling relationship between discourse and
practice illuminates a key tension of the civilizing mission, and I argue, an enduring feature of
humanitarianism. I embrace historian Michael Barnett’s vision of humanitarianism as a tool
which makes power, in this case that of the colonial state, visible in “relations of care” to draws
links between an epidemic firmly rooted in the era of the civilizing mission and expressions of
humanitarianism in the latter part of the twentieth century. 82
A New, Benevolent Power in the Asia-Pacific
The rise of American empire in the Asia-Pacific was intimately connected to the demise
of Spanish authority in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Less than five years before the
1902 outbreak of Asiatic cholera, the United States purchased the Philippine archipelago from
Spain for $20,000,000 on December 10, 1898.83 The Treaty of Paris, which failed to include any
Filipino advocates, signaled the end of the brief but decisive Spanish-American War. After
months of mounting tension between Spanish and American officials, armed conflict erupted in
response to the 1898 sinking of the USS Maine in the Havana harbor. The sitting U.S. President,
William McKinley, had dispatched the ship to Havana to protect American interests in the midst
of a Cuban rebellion against Spanish rule. The U.S. insisted that Spain orchestrated the explosive
attack and loss of American lives. Little evidence supported this claim, but the U.S. military
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moved swiftly to intervene in Spanish affairs across the globe. On May 1, 1898, the U.S.
Admiral George Dewey arrived in Manila, the capital of what the United States would rechristen
‘The Philippine Islands.’84
Dewey’s troops defeated Spanish forces efficiently and effectively. This victory signaled
the arrival of a new colonial power in Southeast Asia. With it, the American government took its
place in the region alongside European imperial states including the Dutch in the East Indies, the
British in Hong Kong and Malaya, and the French in Indochina.85 Tens of thousands of U.S.
soldiers soon arrived in the archipelago to find the Spanish government, which had administered
the Philippines as a colonial state for over three-hundred years, collapsed. Local nationalist
forces were in control of most of the provinces around Manila. Calls to end colonial rule in the
Philippines had grown more animated in the preceding years under the direction of the famed
Filipino revolutionary Emilio Aguinaldo, who led campaigns against the Spanish and later the
Americans. Returning from exile under Admiral Dewey’s orders, Aguinaldo proclaimed
Philippine independence on June 21, 1898. He formalized the constitution of the First Philippine
Republic in 1899 and served as the first president of this independent state until his capture by
American forces two years later.86
As Philippine dreams of independence came to fruition after Spanish defeat, the United
States made plans to annex the entire archipelago. The American military initially seized control
of the Island of Luzon, where Manila is located, but wanted to establish a more secure hold of
the other islands. President McKinley’s advisors at the Treaty of Paris believed it would be
difficult for the U.S. to defend the Philippine Islands from Manila if another colonial power grew
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interested in the archipelago. Historian Stuart Creighton Miller, who does not approach the
civilizing mission was a codified ideology, presents the American venture into the Philippines as
a “historical accident” rather than a clear-cut imperial design. He argues that McKinley’s
advisors felt it “cheaper and more humane to take the entire Philippines than to keep only a part
of it.”87 With the word “humane,” Miller firmly situates the American arrival in the Philippines
in the age of “new imperialism” and the discourse of the civilizing mission surveyed in Chapter
One. Many American actors, both in Washington, D.C. and in the Philippine Islands, operated
under the auspices of alleged altruism and with a firm conviction of their own superior civilized
status.
Aguinaldo’s government and its nationalist supporters threatened American plans to
“civilize” inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. Competing visions for the archipelago –
sovereignty versus indefinite American occupation – devolved into armed conflict in February
1899. A form of colonial warfare, this fighting served a unique purpose. As geographer Jean
Gottman explained, colonial campaigns sought not to destroy or kill the enemy, but to “create
life” and structure within a conquered territory.88 In the Philippine Islands, conquest and
administration grew inextricably linked. American military victories quickly translated into the
expansion of communication, transportation, and public health networks throughout the
archipelago, though fierce fighting continued between American and Philippine forces until
1902.89 At the outset of the occupation, President McKinley described the American mission in
the Philippine Islands as one of “benevolent assimilation.” In an 1898 address, McKinley
informed his audience that it was “the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration
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to win the confidence, respect, and affection” of local people. Native residents of the Philippines
would enjoy the “full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free
people” when the U.S. government deemed it appropriate. Until then, American leaders
maintained the right to regulate everyday life.90 This image of the modern colonial
administration appealed to many Americans, though some of McKinley’s contemporaries
recognized the hypocrisy of the American mission. Illinois Republican Senator William E.
Mason, who served in the U.S. Senate from 1899 to 1902, openly challenged his Party’s support
of annexation. Criticizing one of the key incongruities of civilizing ideology, Mason warned:
“God almighty help the party that seeks to give civilization and Christian liberty hypodermically
with thirteen-inch guns.”91
Historiographic Challenges in the Study of U.S. Empire
Senator Mason’s opinion speaks to larger concerns in the historiography of American
empire during this period. His striking cry exposes the two faces of American imperialism: that
which promoted philanthropic visions of American assistance and that which justified violence
in the name of civilizing. This divide endures in popular and scholarly notions of the American
history of expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Popular narratives of American
colonialism in the Asia-Pacific, as well as in the American West and the Caribbean, have
historically failed to treat the United States as a true imperial agent.92 In a study of Southeast
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Asia, 1919-1941, historian Anne L. Foster explains that American imperialism is rarely
considered alongside that of the “canonical empires” of Europe.93 Miller posits that American
scholars have difficulty reconciling perceived incompatibilities between empires of the Old and
New Worlds. Many traditional histories do recognize the extent to which features of the Old
World, such as militarism, imperialism, inequality, and abuses of power, influenced American
policy, though historians have made concerted more efforts to discuss American empire in the
explicit language of empire since the 1990s.94 This hesitance, Miller argues, nurtured a sense of
American exceptionalism in historical literature. Overemphasis on the burden of an altruistic
iteration of imperialism obscured unsavory histories of American colonial rule. Miller and Foster
deconstruct this “conveniently selective collective memory” about U.S. empire much like
Michael Barnett and Britt Halvorson challenge the historical amnesia that often afflicts narratives
of humanitarianism.95 Subject to these dual patterns of forgetting, the American project of
civilizing in the Philippine Islands sheds light on some of the key principles of Barnett’s Imperial
Humanitarianism discussed in Chapter One.
The American occupation of the Philippine Islands was a clear and cogent expression of
the “new imperialism” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In studies of imperial discourse,
Foster instructs scholars to consider imperialistic thought and behavior along a continuum
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spanning from formal colonial rule to “contingent independence.”96 She describes imperialism as
a “developmental project of indefinite duration.”97 At the outset of the cholera outbreak, the
American administration in the Philippine Islands relied on elements of both traditional colonial
rule and “new” imperialism. Colonial actors emphasized the civilizing nature of their work, but
also called for the imposition of formal structures of imperial power. In an April 1900 entry of
the Official Gazette, an internal government publication about U.S. foreign interests, President
McKinley wrote the following to Hon. William H. Taft, then the President of the Board of
Commissioners to the Philippine Islands:
…The Commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing
is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for
the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even
their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government.98
McKinley frames American colonial rule as flexible and dedicated to the “happiness,
peace, and prosperity” of new subjects. He insisted that the preservation of local social and
cultural systems was of paramount importance to his administration, and that the overarching
American objective in the Philippine Islands was to establish a “just and effective government”
for the people. Yet, what begins as a lofty survey of American goals for this new colony quickly
pivots to become the concrete delineation of a civilizing mission.
In the same document, McKinley informs the Commission that the protection of natives’
autonomy was conditional. The “uncivilized” “people of the Islands” had to comply with
American rules and standards to achieve the “prosperity” they were promised. Principles and
rules of government, he instructed, “must be established and maintained in the Islands for the
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sake of [the natives’] liberty and happiness.”99 McKinley explains that local sources of authority,
such as tribal governments, should “be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue
or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs.”100 In other words, to cultivate “civilization” in the
Philippine Islands, the United States would first enforce strict rules and regulations and maintain
a strict hierarchy of colonial power.
Imperial Humanitarianism, Health, and Hygiene
Western practices of hygiene and sanitation were among the most significant “civilized
customs” that McKinley referred to. In the Philippine Islands, a commitment to developing
health infrastructure was a core feature of the American benevolent colonial identity. The
objectives of this focus on health and hygiene were two-fold. First, attention to public health
positioned the American government to inherit the “White Man’s Burden” from European
empires of the Old World. Kipling called upon the United States to join the fight against disease
and famine in the “uncivilized” world. An effective answer confirmed that the United States was
both willing and able to meet such demands. Second, a commitment to medicine, science, and
aid was a way to distinguish American colonial rule from that of the Spanish. These motivations
framed American rule of the Philippines as an innovative exercise in not just empire, but
modernity. As Chapter One discusses, the capacity to undertake massive projects of biomedical
intervention confirmed the scientific and technological superiority of, in this case, American
civilization. Speaking from this vantage point, William H. Taft, the first civil Governor-General
of the Philippines from 1900-1903, proclaimed that in this period, teaching native residents the
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“simple facts of hygiene, unpopular and difficult as the process of education has been, [would]
prove to be one of the great benefits given by the Americans to this people.”101
In Taft’s view, medico-sanitary instruction was an exclusively American contribution to
inhabitants of the archipelago. American officials emphasized this impact to carve out U.S.
imperialism in opposition to that of Spain. This was one way of reconciling, while still
distinguishing, the imperialisms of the New and Old Worlds. Joseph R. Hayden, a vice governor
of the islands in the 1930s, described one of the “great achievements” of the early twentieth
century as the introduction of an “essentially scientific attitude” in the Philippine government
and people. Equipped with the trappings of modern medicine and technology, as well as the
accompanying sense of superiority Adas describes, the Americans expressed great disdain for the
outdated, “unscientific ways of Spanish days.”102 Making this distinction between old and new
explicit was a priority for early American civil authorities. An Official Gazette correspondence
from January 1903 between President McKinley and R.A. Alger, the U.S. Secretary of War,
stated that “the first full effect of the military occupation of the enemy’s territory is the severance
of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political
power.”103 American authorities attempted to win local support and fortify their power with
rhetoric of “liberty,” “freedom,” and “happiness.”
American authority in the Philippine Islands remained in a precarious position when
Asiatic cholera arrived in Manila in March 1902. U.S. military forces had barely subdued
nationalist fighting and guerilla warfare continued in some corners of the archipelago. Reynaldo
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C. Ileto, a Filipino historian, argues that in their eagerness to establish themselves as a new
colonial power in Southeast Asia, the United States transposed colonial warfare from local
battlefields onto bodies.104 In 1901, the U.S. government approved the assembly of a Civil Board
of Health in the Philippine Islands. This group, composed of American medical personnel and
two honorary Filipino officials, regulated the practice of medicine in the colony and oversaw
provincial and municipal boards of health. When cholera broke out, according to historian Ken
De Bevoise, these health authorities believed it imperative to deploy “the most up-to-date
epidemiological theories” to respond to cholera more “decisively and effectively” than Spanish
officials ever had.105 The United States seized upon this opportunity to construct their colonial
authority in terms of health and medical aid. They presented their intellectual and material
superiority, evident in their possession of biomedical knowledge and tools, as inseparable from
their moral superiority. In 1902, Ileto maintains, a sense of “boundless self-righteousness”
supplemented American eagerness and ability to intervene in the epidemic.106
American authorities reconstituted the archipelago as a “laboratory” in terms of scientific
and medical intervention and the civilizing mission ideology of the early twentieth century. The
Americans viewed their response to cholera as a test that would confirm their mastery of modern
science and technology. This would illustrate that American knowledge, and therefore American
civilization, was universally defined and applicable. In effectively controlling and treating
cholera, the Americans would demonstrate that their medicine was protective and its purveyors
compassionate, as well as paternalistic. I do not suggest that all American actors in the
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Philippines were calculating and controlling in their practice of medicine. Many likely delivered
healthcare because they felt it a noble, moral duty to vulnerable populations. To account for a
multiplicity of perspectives, I assess the American response to cholera between 1902-1904 using
two primary categories: discourse and practice. Exploration of these features and their complex
relationship reveals some of the ways in which the rhetoric of the civilizing mission translated, or
did not translate, into disease intervention. A closer look at the period of Imperial
Humanitarianism presents colonial forays into humanitarian concern as multidimensional, and,
as Chapters Three and Four will also reveal, often rife with contradiction.
Articulating the American Mission in the Archipelago
From its inception, the American experience in the Philippine Islands was coated in the
language of the civilizing mission. This rhetoric was not exclusively reductive. At the outset of
the occupation in 1898, President McKinley instructed Governor-General Taft that “a sense of
duty to not merely observe the material but the personal and social rights of the people of the
Islands” had to be impressed upon all American civil and military personnel in the islands.
Officers and employees of the United States, McKinley wrote, must learn to treat local residents
“with the same courtesy and respect for their personal dignity which the people of the United
States are accustomed to require from each other.”107 In this entry to the Official Gazette from
April 1900, President McKinley’s comparison between American and Filipino rights conveys a
sense, however fleeting, of egalitarianism. This sentiment emerges in some accounts of the 19021904 epidemic as well. The Evening Star, an American newspaper, reported in August of 1902
that the Americans had already learned that “much more can be accomplished in eradicating
cholera from provincial towns by enlisting the aid of natives than by instituting forceful and
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arbitrary measures.”108 A departure from what modern scholars may expect from colonial
documents, these statements might suggest that some members of the American government and
public respected local actors at the time. Such sentiments reveal a surprising awareness of the
agency of Filipinos yet perpetuate romanticized notions about the collaborative nature of
American rule.
Scientists and public health officers initially cautioned against the use of interventions
that employed “forceful and arbitrary measures.”109 In an experimental study of inoculation
against Asiatic cholera during the epidemic, Dr. Richard P. Strong expressed the
“impracticability” of introducing a vaccine into the Islands. Strong, who worked in the Bureau of
Government Laboratories in Manila built by the U.S. Government in 1901, found that a vaccine
was a promising tool to curb the spread of disease. However, it elicited a “severe local and
general reaction.” Strong concluded the “natives would not voluntarily submit to it,” and
therefore it was “inadvisable” to make vaccination compulsory.110 These statements suggest that
Strong was aware that native cooperation was essential to the treatment of cholera. Dr. Thomas
R. Marshall, the Chief Health Inspector for the Philippine Islands, similarly called for a cautious
cholera response. Drawing upon McKinley’s logic of courtesy in 1904, Marshall conceded that
articles such as pillows or mattresses used by the sick could be removed, but that “the destruction
of property to prevent contagion is seldom necessary.”111
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Even so, explicit civilizing rhetoric often tempered American recognition of local
concerns and entitlements. In the passage above, President McKinley highlights one of the key
paradoxes of the civilizing mission. He expounds on the need to ensure protection and provide
rights to new Filipino subjects but places the onus of this protection on American officials. This
distribution of tasks suggests that members of the archipelago’s native population were incapable
of protecting themselves; one day they could access all the rights Americans possessed, but that
day had not yet arrived.
In his initial survey of the responsibilities of a civil health service in the Philippine
Islands, President McKinley explained that “the many degrees of civilization and varieties of
customs and capacity among the people of the different islands” would dictate their involvement
in selecting their own officers. For less “civilized” communities, “it [would] be necessary to fill
some offices for the present with Americans, which after a time, may well be filled by natives of
the Islands.”112 These “degrees” of civilization ran along the same lines of race, class, and
religion that governed Philippine society under Spanish rule. The U.S. Army Volunteers
organized American and Filipino workers in strict hierarchies. In Manila, commanding sanitary
officers were almost exclusively white American men.113 As Figures 3 and 4 illustrate, Filipino
Volunteers served in subordinate positions as assistants. While Filipinos had once been
employed as inspectors, they were quickly replaced due to their supposed failure to effectively
enforce sanitary measures.114 Local men, perhaps those excluded from Army Volunteer positions
on the basis of class or race, worked as scouts or in sanitation brigades scattered throughout the
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city (Figure 5). These exclusionary policies, many Americans believed, were the natural
response to local’s perceived inability to comprehend principles of modern hygiene and
sanitation.
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Chief Health Inspector Marshall echoed this assumption of Filipino ineptitude in his 1903
publication “Asiatic Cholera in the Philippine Islands.” This study, circulated in the Health
Bulletin of the U.S. Department of the Interior, proclaimed: “Many of the numerous hygienic
defects can be remedied by the people themselves, if they could only be taught to realize how
disease is spread and contracted.”117 Marshall skillfully blends a hint of American esteem with a
dismissive conclusion. He implies that island residents were capable of caring for themselves,
but ignorance, as Kipling suggested, prevented them from doing so. By this logic, the absence of
American intervention might allow cholera to spread unchecked throughout the Islands.
Attempts to rationalize the United States’ mission to contain cholera relied heavily on these
colonial tropes of native incompetence and naiveté. One contributor to the Cablenews-American
Sunday cried that despite American attempts to prevent consumption of decayed food and
contaminated water, “the densely ignorant adult native persists in compassing his own death.”118
This reductive attitude reflected a popular opinion at the time. The conviction that natives were
oblivious and “uncivilized” overshadowed the notion that local voluntary cooperation was a key
determinant of a successful health campaign. Consequently, American aid was not only
necessary, but just.
Many American officials described natives’ roles in the 1902-1904 cholera epidemic in
overwhelmingly disparaging terms. Such characterizations shed light on the divergence of
discourse and practice in the American response to the disease. After receiving reports of cholera
in Southern China, Victor G. Heiser, the chief quarantine officer of the Islands, imposed a
maritime quarantine on Manila Bay. The Bureau of Health soon extended this policy of
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quarantine, inspection, and isolation to the entire archipelago, but it was met great with
resistance.119 Subject to an American experiment in public health and control, neither Manila nor
the provinces resembled laboratory conditions. Luke Wright, an acting Governor General of the
Islands during Taft’s tenure, wrote to Taft that “the ignorant natives resent our modern methods
of dealing with cholera.”120 To Wright, who assumed the governorship in 1904, the natives’
ignorance stemmed from both an absence and rejection of modernity. Under these circumstances,
acts of defiance reaffirmed American assumptions about the inferiority of the local population.
Military surgeons, who led most cholera operations on the ground, described their
interactions with cholera victims in similarly disdainful terms. In the official August 1902 Public
Health Report from Manila, surgeon and quarantine officer J.C. Perry lamented the impossibility
of controlling cholera in Manila. He explained that attempts to quarantine and eradicate the
disease in the early months of the outbreak failed due to “the ignorance and opposition of the
people.” The epidemic may have been avoided if inhabitants of affected centers “were intelligent
Americans or Europeans” rather than persons who “[would] adopt every measure to conceal the
cases and [threw] every obstacle in the way of the authorities in their attempts to suppress the
disease.”121 Perry specified that Filipino physicians were equally as guilty as the laity in
shielding infected individuals from American detection. In the province of Cebu, Assistant
Surgeon H.A. Stanfield described the cholera situation as “very serious.” He attributed high rates
of cholera to rumors “rife among the Filipinos that all going to the hospital are poisoned.”
Stanfield dismissed this rumor and unsurprisingly, concludes that it arose from a place of “dense
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ignorance.”122 The diminutive tone of these testimonies exposes the extent to which civilizing
rhetoric and presumed superiority influenced the speech of colonial actors. Such accounts
corroborate the circular narrative of the civilizing mission: “uncivilized” societies’ refusal to
comply with American intervention was further proof that they remained “uncivilized” and
required supervision. However, each of these men fail to address one key question: why did
affected populations go to such great lengths to “resist” American aid?

The “Scientific Ways” of American Days: Cholera Containment in Practice

Figure 5. “The line pail brigade, disinfecting during the cholera epidemic in Manila.”123
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The U.S. government relied on a strategy of containment and surveillance to control the
explosion of cholera in the Islands between 1902 and 1904. New studies in the field of
bacteriology and the ability identify the Vibrio cholerae bacterium under the microscope
informed the imposition of strict quarantines, relocation to cholera detention camps, and in some
infamous cases, the destruction of property.124 These purportedly modern tactics did not translate
smoothly to the Philippine context. Instead, they sparked fear and incited what American
officials perceived to be resistance. Government workers such as Thomas R. Marshall and
Richard P. Strong had cautioned against the forcible implementation of public health measures.
President McKinley, in 1900, instructed the civil government of the Islands to prioritize local
cooperation and to reject tyrannical tendencies. Considered in light of these testimonies, fractures
between American rhetoric and practice become painfully visible.
After its arrival in the capital on March 20, 1902, cholera spread among Manila residents
at an alarming rate. American scientists knew that cholera traveled via contaminated water, food,
and between infected persons and moved quickly to consolidate immense power in government
hands.125 The Bureau of Health placed a strict quarantine on the city to limit personal contact and
social interactions despite a “cultural disinclination” among Filipinos to separate infected
individuals from their family and friends.126 In his autobiography, An American Doctor’s
Odyssey, Dr. Victor G. Heiser revealed how this policy affected cholera victims and their
families in practice. He described the devastation of the 1902-1904 outbreak in the following
scene:
Uniformed men clattered up with ambulances and without ceremony lifted the sick from
their mats and carted them away from their wailing families. Four times out of five this
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was the last they ever saw of their loved ones until shortly they received a curt notice to
come to the hospital and claim their dead.127

Figure 6. “Disinfecting in front of Cholera houses, Manila.”128

In the Farola barrio, home to the first cases of cholera, American officials experimented
with policies of house burning and isolation. Most dwellings in this poor district, pictured in the
colorized image above, were made of nipa-palm, a highly flammable natural material (Figure 6).
American authorities intended to burn homes where cholera had been present but found it
difficult to contain the fires they set. Taken in 1902, Figure 7 captures the particularly infamous
day that untamed flames razed the Farola barrio to the ground. Under American direction,
sanitary brigades tended to deploy tactics that favored wealthier Manila residents (Figure 5).
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Rather than set homes alight, sanitary workers whitewashed the wooden houses of Manila’s elite
and left the structures intact.129

Figure 7. “The burning of Cholera infected district of Farola, 1902.”130

When the policy of burning and destruction proved unsustainable, American authorities
refocused their priorities on containment. In the already resource poor quarters of the Farola
district, conditions deteriorated rapidly. In August 1902, Dean C. Worcester, the Secretary of the
Interior in the Islands, wrote that the quarantine of this population had grown “inhumane” and
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could not continue.131 A policy of isolation soon became one of relocation. Rather than confine
at risk populations in their homes, American forces relocated individuals suspected of infection
to cholera detention camps on the grounds of city hospitals. One of these camps, pictured below
in 1903, was located at San Lazaro Hospital near Manila (Figure 8). Built by the Spanish as a
church and hospital in the sixteenth century, San Lazaro Hospital remains one of oldest medical
institutions in the Philippines. The American military assumed control of the Hospital in 1898,
and converted it into a contagious disease hospital under the jurisdiction of the Board of Health
in 1899.132

Figure 8. “Manila; Cholera detention camp, barrack, San Lazaro, front view.”133
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The Bureau of Health also attempted to regulate death and burial procedures. Much like
the policies enacted in the Farola barrio, new requirements disproportionately affected poor
communities. Burial grounds in Manila filled only four months after disease outbreak in March.
American officials feared that the bodies of cholera victims would contaminate groundwater
sources if not properly buried and proposed a policy of cremation. Intense local resistance to this
idea redirected the Bureau of Health’s plans. Renamed the Insular Board of Health by this time,
this body required all cadavers be buried in metallic coffins a minimum of seven feet
underground. Officials knew that this was a financial impossibility for most local families, but
offering an alternative burial option made cremation appear more of a choice than forced
practice. These officials did not anticipate that many Manila residents would resort to performing
clandestine burials. They left their loved ones in shallow graves or in local water sources rather
than acquiesce to inflexible American demands.134
Like this burial policy, quarantines had unforeseen, if not disastrous effects on the spread
of cholera. In the provinces surrounding Manila, the American response to cholera intersected
with military endeavors. Throughout the duration of the epidemic, American troops
intermittently engaged in violent skirmishes with nationalist resistance forces. The U.S. military
pursued a policy of “reconcentration” to limit the flow of material goods to guerilla fighters and
to secure their hold on the archipelago. Civil authorities drew new town boundaries to
“reconcentrate” populations in fortified, highly regulated zones.135 War caused severe
agricultural dislocation in the preceding years, and inhabitants of these areas relied heavily on
American food provisions.136 Intended to be a show of strength, “reconcentration” campaigns

134

Ileto, “Cholera and the Origins of the American Sanitary Order in the Philippines,” 137.
Ibid., 140.
136
DeBevoise, Agents of Apocalypse, 178.
135

63

rendered Filipino populations more vulnerable to undernutrition and disease. These living
conditions, Ileto claims, made “a mockery of sanitation” and increased the chances that cholera,
once it arrived, would spread rapidly among a large number of individuals.137 This system of
population regulation, which had both political and public health implications, engendered a
dependence on external food supplies and challenged the efficacy of quarantines. Transport of
food and goods across the country required human movement. Civil authorities in Manila
devised plans to allow food to leave the capital but could not prevent the formation of extralegal
networks of travel and trade.
American practices implemented in response to cholera rarely had the desired effect.
Attempts to bring local populations under strict control were largely ineffectual and often
exacerbated the spread of cholera. The enforcement of new burial regulations caused an increase
in unregulated disposal of the dead. Threats of relocation and detention camps in Manila sparked
flight from the city and fearful residents spread disease as they fanned out across the
archipelago.138 In his September 1902 entry in the Public Health Report from the Islands,
quarantine officer J.C. Perry denounced the system he worked to enforce. Five months after the
epidemic began, he wrote, “The attempt of land quarantine has proved ineffective – in fact,
absolutely worthless – and the old history is repeated for town after town.” Revealing the
weaknesses of this permeable structure, he explains that “Persons arrive from an infected pueblo,
have the disease after arrival, and in a few days 4 or 5 cases occur and the epidemic starts.”139
Food insecurity and the need to maintain travel and communication between these “infected
pueblo[s]” similarly hampered the effectiveness of this system. As they did with burials, people
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found new ways to travel avoiding American detection. The spread of cholera across the islands
was likely inevitable, but it seems that attempts to bring the disease under greater American
supervision only made it harder to track. Although the American occupation of the Philippine
Islands was not the cause of the epidemic, DeBevoise argues, it created the conditions “that
made epidemic diffusion a certainty.”140
American attempts to contain cholera additionally stirred fear and panic in native
populations. House burnings in the Farola district generated outcry and discontent. Policies of
relocation and cremation drove many to conceal disease when they encountered it. Reporting
cholera to sanitary authorities posed great risk of personal loss or family separation. Dr. P.H.
Pardo de Tavera, one of the two honorary Filipino members of the Philippine Commission,
warned Governor General Taft about this consequence of American policy. “The people fear the
Board of Health a great deal more than they fear the epidemic,” he wrote in May 1902.141
Rumors from this period also capture this anxiety. H.A. Stanfield, in July 1902, reported that in
the province of Cebu, stories had begun circulating that hospitals and wells had been poisoned.
By his account, “This was first blamed on Filipinos, later on Chinamen, and now the Americans
are accused.”142 This description of the American regime in the Philippine Islands hardly
resembles the benevolent power McKinley and his contemporaries envisioned. Fear and mistrust
grew out of an American recognition and subsequent dismissal of local concerns in the practice
of public health. Though techniques of quarantine and health surveillance may have been
modern, they were evidently not universal in reach.
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“A Model Colonial Health Service”
The U.S. government arrived in Southeast Asia at the end of the nineteenth century
determined to construct a unique imperial identity. This colonial character, born from earlier
imperial orders, was meant to distinguish American empire from the existing colonial states in
the region. Cholera engulfed the Philippine Islands at a pivotal moment in this process. The first
major epidemic during the American occupation, this disease outbreak transformed the
archipelago into a testing ground not only for modern Western science and medicine, but also for
the American version of the civilizing mission. In emphasizing its benevolence, paternalistic
concern, and capability, the American administration demonstrated that health – as Kipling
advocated – was a viable conduit of colonial power. This case from the era of Imperial
Humanitarianism is particularly salient because, as Anderson explains, American officials
worked hard to portray the Philippines as a “model colonial health service.”143 This does not
mean that the American experience with cholera in the Philippine Islands was representative of
all colonial health projects in this era. Rather, the concerted effort to appear as an exemplar
suggests that the policies and practices developed in this highly specific context had lasting
influences. Chief among these impacts, I argue, was the inability to reconcile theory and practice
in aid provision.
Policies of containment and quarantine rarely reflected official rhetoric surrounding the
American mission in the Philippines. Government officials including the U.S. President enthused
about the American commitment to generosity and respect of local tradition. McKinley and his
contemporaries called for a participatory approach to public health. Yet, when confronted with
the reality of providing healthcare in the “living laboratory” of the archipelago, these actors
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employed coercive, and often ineffectual, practices reminiscent of traditional imperial
convention. This inconsistency in the American colonial identity, Chapters Three and Four
reveal, became a consistent feature in humanitarian institutions of later eras. Analysis of the two
subsequent case studies also reinforces the notion that healthcare and politics were and are
inextricably intertwined. The American quest to construct a colonial identity premised on care
and compassion was arguably an early iteration of a “hearts and minds” campaign. This term
from the Cold War period describes efforts to secure political allegiance through humanitarian
means. 144 This concept is particularly important in Chapter Three, though its relevance here
speaks to the historical continuities made visible in expressions of quasi-humanitarianism in the
age of the civilizing mission.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Professional Volunteer; The Political Humanitarian:
Médecins Sans Frontières and the Birth of a “Movement” along the Thai-Cambodian
Border
Khao-I-Dang, Sa Kaeo, Thailand, 1980
“An International Synonym for Disaster and Humanitarian Concern”
In February 1980, the refugee camp Khao-I-Dang was home to the largest aggregation of
Khmer people in the world. Often described as the second largest “city” in Thailand, this
sprawling encampment was a response to crisis in Cambodia. Khmer refugees first fled their
homes in 1975 to escape the atrocities, later recognized as genocide, perpetrated under the
Khmer Rouge regime. Vietnamese forces intervened in Cambodia on December 24, 1978. This
campaign effectively ended the genocide but drove hundreds of thousands of refugees, many
fearing the possibility of long-term Vietnamese occupation, into southeastern Thailand. Under
these circumstances, Washington Post journalist William Shawcross deemed ‘Cambodia’ “an
international synonym for disaster and humanitarian concern.”145 International aid agencies,
including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), began relief operations in the region during these
years of harrowing violence and bitter conflict. By the end of the decade, an expansive
humanitarian operation had assembled along the Thai-Cambodian border. In a first-hand account
from Khao-I-Dang, British physician Neil R. M. Buist estimated that nearly twenty international
agencies were active in this camp by July 1980. Reflecting on this spectacular display of support,
Buist concluded that for groups like the United Nations (UN), the International Rescue
Committee (IRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as new
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voluntary organizations (volags) like MSF, “the world crisis” constituted “the major raison
d’être.”146
Located approximately twelve kilometers from the Thai-Cambodian border, Khao-IDang accommodated over 140,000 people at its peak.147 After years subject to disruption,
dislocation, and violence, many Khmer refugees faced acute health burdens that medical
humanitarian actors hastened to treat. Children, for example, suffered from malnutrition,
pneumonia, diarrheal diseases, measles, and meningitis at high rates in early 1980.148 Khao-IDang housed the only surgical hospital on the southeastern border of Thailand and Cambodia, as
well as a larger medical facility with seventeen functioning wards.149 These included emergency,
surgical, pediatric and obstetric units, and centers dedicated to the treatment of malnutrition,
tuberculosis and general medical concerns for all ages.150 Within the confines of Khao-I-Dang,
an American medical student, Barry S. Levy, described a “tremendous esprit de corps” among
international medical actors. Levy lamented that the camp’s bamboo and thatch facilities lacked
the “trappings of a modern emergency room in the United States,” but felt that the wards
functioned with surprising ease. 151 Alight with fires of compassion and moral obligation, many
humanitarian actors describe their experience in Khmer refugee camps as overwhelmingly
impactful and unifying. Levy, for instance, proclaimed his work at Khao-I-Dang to be the “most
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moving, sobering, and gratifying experience of [his] life, and in many ways the most real.”152
Compelling testimonials like Levy’s emphasize the central role that the Khmer refugee camp
played in the personal and professional lives of aid workers. Scholars argue that this exceptional
site looms large in the global humanitarian imagination as well.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, publicly and proudly
proclaims its work in the Cambodian crisis to be one of its first and most formative missions. In
representations of the institution’s experience in Cambodia, MSF focuses predominantly on its
own role, rather than on larger geopolitical circumstances or on Khmer refugees themselves.
With this narrative of its early work, MSF illuminates some of the avenues by which legacies of
imperial humanitarianism endure in the twentieth century. The American government, as
discussed in Chapter Two, actively used the 1902-1904 Philippine cholera epidemic to create a
new colonial character. In contrast, I argue, MSF has retroactively constructed the ThaiCambodian refugee camp as a “laboratory” from which its institutional identity premised on
expertise, political action, and universal reach emerged. Today, MSF is a model international
non-governmental organization. The principles that guide its work set standards for medical
relief programs around the world.
Using a sophisticated combination of textual and visual rhetoric, MSF constructs its
history to articulate a particular humanitarian logic that concurrently rejects and preserves
paradoxes of the civilizing mission. Narratives of the Cambodian experience recognize the
paternalistic pitfalls of humanitarian work, yet strip the Khmer camp, and refugee subject, of
historic specificity. Missing from much of this discourse is concrete discussion of medical
practice during this period. This conspicuous absence underscores the notion that for MSF, the
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past is closely tied to the humanitarian present and to the organization’s contemporary practice of
humanitarian medicine. To ameliorate the effects of this humanitarian amnesia, it is critical
situate the Thai-Khmer border camp within broader histories of international interest and
intervention during the Cold War period. This critical approach does not aim to undermine or
undervalue the real and consequential medical care that MSF provided to Khmer refugee
populations, but to illuminate the salient features and challenges of medical aid work in the age
of Neo-Humanitarianism. A portrait of the extensive humanitarian operation at Khao-I-Dang, for
example, allows the modern scholar to ask: why was the international community so interested
and involved in humanitarian care on this particular border at this particular time?
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Map 2. Refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border, 1980.153

Khao-I-Dang was one of many refugee camps located along the Thai-Cambodian border
in 1980 (Map 2). While many border camps restricted access to international humanitarian
workers and journalists, a range of foreign actors were active at Khao-I-Dang due to its
association with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). This particular
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site was a transit camp for refugees awaiting resettlement in third countries such as the United
States.154 For this reason, statistics and testimonials from Khao-I-Dang were particularly welldocumented and preserved. The availability of these resources makes Khao-I-Dang a strong
subject for historical research, as well as a focal point of larger historical developments in the
mid-twentieth century.
The history of UNHCR, the official UN Refugee Agency, and the refugee camp as a
humanitarian tool, is distinctly tied to that of the Second World War. Officially chartered and
adopted in 1945, the United Nations (UN) evolved in a series of meetings between leaders of the
Allied Powers during WWII. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, first suggested
the term “United Nations” in the 1942 Declaration of Nations.155 The creation of the UN, a
peacekeeping institution, represented the emergence of a new world order guided by principles
of shared humanity and global solidarity. An embodiment of this mission, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed on December 10, 1948. The UN General
Assembly, the document states, made this pronouncement in recognition of “the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [that are] the
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”156 Article 25 of the Declaration specifies
that the protection of health and well-being was and is key to building this foundation.
Popular histories of the UN often describe this institution as a “sudden and novel
reaction” to the atrocities of WWII.157 UNHCR, for instance, was created in 1950 principally to
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assist refugees in Europe, though it extended its operational reach into Africa and Asia in the
1960s and 1970s.158 Political philosopher Giorgio Agamben locates the origins of the modern
refugee camp in the European concentration camp of the Second World War. Agamben, whose
theories of crisis are considered in Chapter One, draws on the scholarship of German philosopher
Hannah Arendt. In her work on totalitarianism, Arendt describes concentration camps as
“laboratories in the experiment of total domination.”159 These unspecified experiments were only
possible under the “extreme,” perhaps exceptional, “circumstances of human made hell.”160
Using the language of the “laboratory,” Arendt places the refugee camp in a rather colonial
lineage. The construct of colony as laboratory, as discussed in Chapter Two, the concentration
camp, and the modern refugee camp are all distinct. They should not be conflated, yet each of
these spaces are notably linked by notions of experimentation and exceptionalism.
The experience and trauma of the Holocaust undoubtedly shaped post-War international
policy and humanitarian practice as Agamben and Arendt suggest. At the same time, burgeoning
Cold War rivalry was embedded and institutionalized in the philosophies that governed systems
like the UN. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, historians Sunil Amrith and Glenda
Sluga argue, constituted “an amalgam of competing, or converging, universalisms.” Amrith and
Sluga describe this competition as one between doctrines of imperialism and anticolonialism, the
“East” and “West,” and old and new.161 Over one-third of the world’s population still lived in
dependent territories at the end of the Second World War. The devastation of war, as well as the
proclamation of a new, global age of collaboration and equality, made the maintenance of formal
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empire untenable for many Western powers. A period of rapid decolonization ensued, as
reflected in the sharp increase in UN member states between 1945 and the new millennium.
Nations emerging from decades or centuries of foreign rule entered into a polarized
world. Champions of liberal democracy in the “West” and advocates of communism in the
“East” fought bitterly to secure the political loyalties of new states. In firm command of the
Western bloc by the end of the War, the United States pursued a policy of containment in regions
it deemed susceptible to communist intrigue. Nowhere was this fear more alive than in Southeast
Asia. Mao Zedoing proclaimed the People’s Republic of China in 1949, a momentous feat in a
struggle between communist and nationalist forces. For many nations born from crumbling
empires, capitalism was closely tied to histories of imperial exploitation. In Indonesia, for
example, anti-colonial movements were closely tied to the communist party, the third largest in
the world in the post-War era. The logic of the Domino Theory – the notion that if one nation fell
to communism or socialism, its neighbors would soon follow – drove the United States and its
Western allies to intervene in conflicts of independence and nationalism overseas throughout the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In Southeast Asia, the Cold War was fought not between political
ideologies in the abstract, but on physical battlefields in real, devastating violence. The resulting
conflicts in formerly dependent regions like Indochina, made up of the modern nation-states
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, created massive refugee populations and need.
In his inaugural address in January 1949, U.S. President Harry S. Truman addressed the
looming consequences of this post-War shift in the global order. Speaking from the American
perspective, Truman recognized that a world of empires was rapidly becoming a world of nations
with the help of organizations like the UN. This new global landscape, he noted, was still tainted
by inequality and human suffering. Rather than discuss the histories of imperialism and
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exploitation that informed these patterns of “underdevelopment,” Truman focused on the
potential for humanitarian good. In language strikingly reminiscent of that surveyed in Chapter
Two, Truman explained the following to the American people:
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific
advances and industrial progress available for improvements and growth of
underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their
economic life is primitive and stagnant…For the first time in history, humanity possesses
the knowledge and skill to relieve these people of suffering.162
UNHCR, the agency that coordinated foreign relief efforts at Khao-I-Dang, and MSF two
decades later, were among the international actors that took up Truman’s “bold new” agenda.
These agencies, each in their own time, embarked on missions to make the instruments of
western science, technology, and care available to the vulnerable populations that often lived in
former colonial territories. This endeavor was and is admirable. Yet, the emphasis on performing
expertise and material mastery, as Truman’s words indicate, centers the narrative of the provider
of healthcare rather the recipient of it. Overemphasis on the humanitarian motives to provide
healthcare, as this study of MSF shows, often obscures the political dimensions that influence
and shape aid work in a particular historical time.
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Colonization and Cold War Conflict in Cambodia
Health care does not take place in a vacuum.
–

Médecins Sans Frontières, Refugee Health163

Refugee camps such as Khao-I-Dang were located firmly on the frontlines of Cold War
conflict in Southeast Asia. A consequence of the violence perpetrated in the name of an
ideological struggle, camps themselves, historian Bertrand Taithe argues, often constituted a
“three-way Cold War front.”164 Scholars discuss international relief work in this setting as part of
“hearts and minds” campaigns during the Cold War. Popular among American policymakers,
these campaigns sought to secure not only political loyalty, but also emotional and intellectual
allegiance to the West through the provision of social services like education and healthcare.165
Khmer refugee camps like Khao-I-Dang emerged in the later stages of the Cold War. However,
though the region formerly known as French Indochina had been the scene of global superpower
rivalry for decades. Histories of colonization, international intervention, and enduring tensions
between neighboring factions in Southeast Asia remained alive in Cambodian refugee camps in
the 1980s. To understand the nuances of MSF’s work in the camp setting, it is crucial to situate
the organization and the camp within this larger context.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the French remained one of the few European
powers without an official foothold in Asia. French actors arrived in Southeast Asia in the
seventeenth century, but the era of new imperialism and competition among empires that
accompanied it, accelerated the consolidation of an official colonial state in the region. Under the
mandate of the mission civilisatrice, the ambitious French state sought to rule and ‘civilize’
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indigenous subjects in previously uncolonized territories. After a period of exploration,
occupation, and conflict with local forces, the French established the Union of Indochina in
1887. This Union placed the modern countries of Cambodia and Vietnam under one
administrative body. Laos was incorporated in 1893. French rule, coupled with the development
of Western science and theories of biological racism discussed in Chapter One, exacerbated
existing tensions between the diverse ethnic groups that had inhabited this region for
millennia.166 These colonial legacies become strikingly visible in the stories of Khmer people
who fled their homes to escape not only genocide, but the possibility of life under Vietnamese
rule.
The Cambodian genocide, which precipitated the first wave of Khmer flight into
Thailand, is deeply enmeshed in histories of decolonization and American presence in the Lower
Mekong Region. After a prolonged struggle for liberation, Cambodia proclaimed its
independence from French colonial rule in 1953. Anti-imperial conflict continued in neighboring
Vietnam until the French government formally relinquished its claim to Indochina in 1954. As
European control of the region waned after the Second World War, American fears that
communism would spread from the Soviet Union and China intensified. Aggressively pursuing a
policy of containment, the U.S. forged strong military and aid alliances with Thailand in the
1950s. One of the few territories in Southeast Asia that avoided formal colonization in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Thailand, formerly Siam, housed many of the U.S. military
bases that sustained the American war effort in Vietnam between 1955 and 1975.167

166

For more information about the history of colonial medicine and ethnicity in Indochina see Sokhieng Au, Mixed
Medicines: Health and Culture in French Colonial Cambodia, (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
2011), 15 and Jeremy Hein, From Vietnam Laos, and Cambodia: A Refugee Experience in the United States (New
York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), 11.
167
Fiona Terry, “The Cambodian Refugee Camps in Thailand,” 115.

78

The American Vietnam War, or Vietnamese War of Resistance, was a manifestation of
Cold War conflict that was anything but cold. A perceived incompatibility between competing
political ideologies underwrote decades of destruction in Vietnam, as well as in neighboring
Cambodia. This history, though it is not the primary subject of this research, illuminates key
features of the Cambodian political landscape in the 1970s. General Lon Nol assumed power of
Cambodia in a military coup in 1970. Prime Minister in the deposed government of Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, Lon Nol was widely suspected of collaborating with the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to seize control of the country. Under the impression that North
Vietnamese supply lines ran through the Cambodian countryside, Lon Nol permitted the
American military to deploy a strategy of indiscriminate bombing in rural areas.168 As one
Cambodian villager exclaimed in 1973, “The bombers may kill some Communists but they kill
everyone else too.”169 This policy of bombardment galvanized support for a growing Cambodian
communist party that appealed to desperate and disillusioned rural residents: the Khmer Rouge.
On April 17, 1975, under the leadership of the notorious Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge
overthrew Lon Nol’s government in Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh.170 In an attempt to
construct a true agrarian Marxist society, Pol Pot’s dictatorial regime first embarked on a
classicist project of urbicide, the targeted removal and “reeducation” of urban residents. A Social
Darwinist who studied in Paris and was well-versed in European theories of racial hierarchy, Pol
Pot concurrently pursued a policy of ethnic cleaning. His regime purged non-Khmer populations,
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including ethnic minority populations of Chinese, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cham (Muslim) and
Thai descent, from Cambodia.171 Forced relocation to reeducation camps, physical labor,
starvation, systematized torture, and execution coalesced in what is now known as the
Cambodian genocide. The Khmer Rouge engineered the deaths of between 1.5 and 2.2 million
residents of Cambodia, or approximately twenty percent of the country’s population at the
time.172 The genocide proceeded relatively uninterrupted until 1978 when Vietnamese forces, in
retaliation against Khmer Rouge’s targeting of ethnic Vietnamese populations, invaded
Cambodia to upend Pol Pot’s regime. Former director of research at MSF and historian Fiona
Terry notes that the arrival of the Vietnamese neither ended conflict nor Khmer Rouge influence
in Cambodia. It reoriented battlefields to border and refugee camps.173 Although many fled
Cambodia during the reign of the Khmer Rouge, a second flood of refugees erupted in response
to the arrival of the Vietnamese. This second wave inundated the Thai border beginning in
1978.174
A Self-Proclaimed Model Emergency Responder
Médecins Sans Frontières was among the earliest and most vocal actors involved in the
international humanitarian apparatus at the Thai-Khmer border. Officially chartered in 1971,
MSF sent its first “mission” to Cambodia in 1975 to work in relief efforts under other NGOs,
though the group eventually ran the referring hospital at Khao-I-Dang.175 MSF’s growth in the
camp context, and the group’s internationally-renowned status today, frames this organization as
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a particularly interesting case study. According to MSF’s website, thirteen French doctors and
journalists founded the organization in 1968 after witnessing war and famine in Biafra, Nigeria.
By 1971, the group, committed to mobility and emergency action, had grown to include over
three-hundred volunteer doctors, nurses, and logistical staff. 176 Emergency missions “in destitute
Third World settings” define MSF’s historic and contemporary “collective image.”177 Conjuring
histories of exploitation and global inequality, these “destitute” areas are often former European
colonies. MSF’s historic presence in Cambodia, for example, speaks to a French colonial legacy
borne out in continued cultural and social bonds with the former Indochina.
MSF represents its experience in Cambodia as central to the group’s institutional
narrative and identity. The organization frames the Cambodian “crisis,” in the words of Peter
Redfield, as a “narrative turning point.” This research investigates the unique vision of
humanitarianism that emerges in MSF’s discourse about its work in Cambodia, rather than in
recollections about the practice of medicine itself. Today, MSF is a model for relief agencies that
“adopt a borderless sense of space and an ethos of direct intervention and media involvement.”178
For this reason, a critical analysis of this group and its history may offer insights salient for the
international humanitarian community.
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Voicing a Self-Conscious Sensibility
We literally wrote the book on refugee health.
– MSF public health officer179
On an institutional level, MSF cites the organization’s work in Cambodia as an
overwhelmingly influential experience. Early humanitarian missions and the expertise developed
in them, the epigraph above suggests, feature centrally in MSF’s humanitarian sensibility. In
1997, MSF released the book Refugee Health: an approach to emergency situations through an
in-house publisher. Partaking in a tradition of reflection and internal critique, the authors
designed the book to “reflect the lessons learned in the past two decades.” Beginning in the
1970s, they write, a “major shift in thinking” about the provision of healthcare in refugee camps
“occurred not just within the international MSF movement, but within the general relief
community.”180 In this text, MSF appears cognizant of its historical positioning at the time of the
group’s inception. The authors scarcely reference MSF’s French colonial ties to Cambodia, but
notably begin their study with a discussion of Cold War politics.
Refugee Health clearly states that “refugees had a political significance” during the Cold
War period. Early MSF workers interpreted the acceptance of Western aid as confirmation that
refugees had “chosen freedom.”181 In a later publication entitled Humanitarian Medicine, Rony
Brauman, one of MSF’s early leaders and a long-term president of the French chapter, echoes
this sentiment. A physician and scholar that helped transform the organization into the
professional entity it is today, Brauman writes that refugees caught in the Cold War were “no
longer [just] living witnesses.” They were, as the authors of Refugee Health propose, actors who
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“voted with their feet” against “tyrannical regimes.”182 Brauman’s opinion is not necessarily
representative of that of MSF as a whole. However, the integral position he played in Cambodia
and in shaping MSF’s policy and practice during a twelve-year presidency (1982-1994) shows
through in similarities between his language and that of official MSF writers. Brauman’s rhetoric
thus offers a glimpse into MSF’s institutional dynamic.
In Humanitarian Medicine, Brauman recognizes that early forms of humanitarian
medicine were deeply connected to colonial histories. For much of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, humanitarian intervention focused almost exclusively on war between
nation-states in the West. Early humanitarian entities rarely interceded in colonies on behalf of
indigenous populations fighting imperial forces. Brauman also notes that medicine was often
deployed as a tool in colonial projects of domination.183 Many humanitarian actors do not
acknowledge this unsavory history out of ignorance or fear that it will jeopardize their moral,
compassionate, and apolitical identities. Brauman, instead, addresses and accepts this history,
unpleasant as it may be. In doing so, he positions MSF as an organization that exists in
opposition to the past. This exercise in reflexivity frames the group as a modern institution that
rejects the paternalistic, coercive tendencies of historic humanitarian practice.
Refugee Health addresses the historical and sociocultural dimensions of humanitarianism
in the context of refugee emergencies. In two introductory chapters, the authors pay particular
attention to the issue of refugee agency in aid projects. Their conclusions resemble those of the
American colonial administrators and scientists in the Philippines, who recognized the
importance of local participation in cholera treatment in theory, but not in practice. Speaking for
MSF in 1997, the authors of Refugee Health proclaimed “the level of refugee participation will
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determine the success or failure of a project.”184 “Refugee populations are not composed of
thousands of victims with no past history,” but are made up of complex communities capable of
participating in their own relief effort. For this reason, these authors explain that:
Time constraints during the initial emergency phase, a lack of background knowledge
about the refugee population and claims that refugees cannot know what is best for them
or are too traumatized to make decisions - should not be used as an excuse not to
encourage refugee participation.185
This critical observation indicates that between the 1970s and the late 1990s, MSF
sharpened its stance as a firmly anti-colonial, collaborative humanitarian actor. It adopted a
rhetoric of inclusivity and self-awareness. The texts surveyed above suggest that MSF’s
experience in Cambodia led the organization to reject reductive conventions of humanitarian
practice, though their language is not so different from that of earlier eras. MSF supplements this
narrative with images. Though they are intended to depict the evolution of a new humanitarian
responder, these visual aids simultaneously make visible some of the colonial legacies that
endure in MSF’s conception of humanitarianism.
The Aesthetics of Absence: Cambodia in MSF’s History
Médecins Sans Frontières presents its organizational history and contemporary work in a
highly curated collection of visual and narrative stimuli displayed on its website. This site is
divided into sections including “About Us,” “What We Do,” “Where We Work,” and “Donate.”
While this research is grounded in the present, it focuses on events portrayed in MSF’s
institutional past. In the subsections “Who We Are” and “History,” a timeline of images and
short captions explain events deemed pivotal in MSF’s history. Contemporary anthropologists
Ruth J. Prince and Lisa Malkki and historian Megan Vaughan argue that humanitarian visual
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narratives draw heavily, and perhaps unknowingly, on many tropes of colonial photography. For
colonial administrators, photography’s affective appeal granted access to a highly stylized set of
“visual economies.”186 Medical missionaries and colonial medical practitioners, arguably earlier
incarnations of the modern medical humanitarian, used images to demonstrate the power of
Western biomedicine. The parade float pictured in Chapter Two is a strong example of this
phenomenon (Figure 2). As both a float and photograph, this object communicated a clear story
about the benefits of Western public health. Vaughan contends that visuals like these offered
biomedicine the opportunity to exercise “biopower” in creating “new notions of subjectivity and
the body.”187 Colonial photography also circulated particular ideas about race, culture,
pathology, and identity between the colony and the metropole.188 The subjectivities created in
colonial photographs and films became fundamental sources of knowledge about both the
indigenous subject and the colonial authority. Using examples from MSF’s website, the modern
viewer can begin to see how historical patterns of representation endure in twentieth and twentyfirst century humanitarian imagery.
Of a selection of approximately forty-five images collated in MSF’s “History” slideshow,
two reference the organization’s work in Cambodia. The timeline begins with an image of
MSF’s founding members drafting the group’s charter on December 22, 1971. Subsequent
photos display and discuss MSF’s first “missions”; they highlight early members’ work in
response to natural disasters and political conflicts in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Lebanon. The
images that represent Cambodia are assigned to the years 1975 and 1980. They are titled
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“Turning Point” and “Cambodia,” respectively.189 This inclusion implies that MSF did in fact
interpret its Cambodian experience as highly significant in its fledgling stages. These two
particular images and their accompanying captions also necessitate the question: what do these
narratives say about the relationship between Cambodia and MSF’s history?

Figure 9. “1975: Turning Point.” “In 1975, MSF establishes its first large-scale medical programme
during a refugee crisis, providing medical care for the waves of Cambodians seeking sanctuary from Pol
Pot’s oppressive rule. In these first missions, the weaknesses of MSF as a new humanitarian organisation
become readily apparent: preparation is lacking, doctors are left unsupported and supply chains are
tangled. It marks a turning point and the movement begins to fracture.”190
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Figure 10. “1980: Cambodia.”“A first "témoignage"- or speaking out, bearing witness - on the
international scene is organised with the "March for Survival of Cambodia."191
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Each of these images ostensibly portrays a different element of MSF’s work in the
Cambodian refugee crisis. The title of the 1975 image, which displays Khmer bodies in what the
viewer assumes to be the scene of a medical mission, references a “Turning Point.” The caption
states that this crisis functioned not as a turning point for refugees, but for MSF as an
organization. Through MSF’s early missions at the Thai-Khmer border, the group’s leaders
recognized the need for a “new humanitarian organization,” which they describe as part of a
“movement,” with logistical backing (Figure 9). The second image from 1980 entitled
“Cambodia” again does not reference the medical care that MSF provided in refugee settlements.
Instead, it shows only white, Western humanitarian actors (Figure 10). Intended to illustrate
MSF’s work in Cambodia, these two narratives are united by a striking absence: that of the
individuated Khmer subject.
These images of Cambodia testify to MSF’s core principles of expertise, emergency
response, and political action. In the “Turning Point,” Khmer subjects appear in exposed, passive
forms; they lie outdoors in relatively cramped quarters and seemingly suffer as they await
humanitarian care (Figure 9). The context of the image is not included in MSF’s caption, nor is
information about the photographer made readily available. The figures in this photo are nonspecific, or representations of what Allen Feldman and Lisa Malkki deem “anonymous
corporeality.”192 This term describes bodies shown with “no names, no funny faces, no
distinguishing marks, [and] no esoteric details of personal style.”193 Based on her field research
with Hutu refugee populations in Tanzania in the 1990s, Malkki submits that conventions of
humanitarian representation often produce both anonymity and speechlessness. Bound up in
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histories of empire and the civilizing mission, the voice of the refugee subject is often cast to the
margins as that of the humanitarian stands in the center. As Prince describes with colonial
photography, visual representations of refugees often become a “translatable and mobile mode of
knowledge about them.”194 The caption of the “Turning Point” explains that Khmer refugees
received MSF’s help as they “sought sanctuary from Pol Pot’s oppressive rule.” While this note
references the larger historical context of the period, the refugee subject ultimately becomes a
source of information about MSF. By this account, it was only in helping distressed Khmer
populations that MSF understood its own weaknesses as a humanitarian entity. This realization
drove the organization to shift its priorities and become the professional NGO committed to
efficient, effective, and independent emergency action that it is today. MSF’s emergency
response, like that of American administration in the Philippines, focuses primarily on the
construction of its own institutional identity.
In both visual and written capacities, “Cambodia, 1980” emphasizes MSF’s role as a
uniquely political humanitarian actor. Unlike “Turning Point,” this image does not discuss the
refugee subject at all. Rather, it shows the event in which MSF’s practice of “témoignage" or
“bearing witness” crystallized. In a history of MSF from the internal journal Centre de Réflexion
sur l’Action et les Savoirs Humanitaires (CRASH), Fabrice Weissman, a former MSF logistician
and scholar of humanitarian action, describes Cambodia as the setting in which “speaking out”
was first tested.195 In December 1979, MSF leaders called for a “March for Survival” on the
Thai-Cambodian border. Event organizers of believed that malnourished refugees arriving in
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Thailand were representative of a population suffering from famine in Cambodia, though this
later proved untrue. On February 6, 1980, MSF leaders including founding members Rony
Brauman and Claude Malhuret arrived at the border ahead of a food convoy. They protested
alongside representatives from Action Internationale Contre le Faim (AICF) and the U.S.-based
IRC.196 In its representation of this event online, MSF relates Cambodia not to Khmer refugees,
but to its development as an organization.
The caption of the image “Cambodia” also employs the rhetoric of universalism. MSF’s
action in Cambodia in 1980, according to the organization, was emblematic of their response to
refugee crises across time and space. To describe the impact that this narrative device has on
refugees themselves, Malkki employs the phrase “dehistoricizing universalism.”197 Made
anonymous, and in this case invisible, the refugee becomes a “pure victim in general,” a
“universal man, universal women, universal child.”198 Fashioning the refugee, the crisis, and the
camp in this way, MSF effectively presents itself as a universal humanitarian advocate.
Rendering refugees speechless in this image and that from 1975, MSF curiously writes the
Khmer subject almost entirely out of its autobiographical narrative. Where refugees are
mentioned, they function only in relation to MSF. Like Filipino subjects in American documents
from the Philippines in 1902, Khmer subjects are used to tell a story about MSF and its
exceptional humanitarian character. In this way, humanitarian actors are also able step in and
offer testimony about refugees and their health from the powerful position of expert.
Médecins Sans Frontières frames its work along the Thai-Khmer border in the 1970s and
1980s to reflect its contemporary character and charter. The organization, I argue, has styled
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representations of its early Cambodian missions to fit a narrative of expertise and experience.
MSF elevates internal voices of critique, rejects paternalism in its modern practice, and remains
cognizant of the delicate historical position of humanitarianism. Yet, knowingly or not, MSF has
refashioned the Khmer refugee camp as a laboratory from which its unique identity emerged.
In the attempt to “civilize” and uplift indigenous populations using Western science and
technology, colonial actors often used the colony as a “theater” in which they staged their
power.199 Similarly, Redfield argues, humanitarian crises function as the “most pure environment
for a technician.”200 In times of great disruption, the technician, or provider of humanitarian
medicine, has the opportunity to cultivate and demonstrate a professional skillset. Sokhieng Au,
a survivor of the Cambodian genocide and a historian of medicine, argues that in the nineteenth
century, French medical practitioners in Indochina, like American actors in the Philippine
Islands, used science and medicine to promote their “professional autonomy.” Distinguishing
their medical knowledge from that of the lay population in both the colony and in Europe,
colonial medical actors framed their practices as authoritatively superior.201 I contend that MSF
treats the refugee camp as a historically productive site critical to their narrative. The
significance of this space is not derived from the care MSF provided, but from the impact the
experience had on MSF’s early leaders. It motivated them, for example, to construct a highly
professional organization staffed predominantly by volunteers. As the caption of the “Turning
Point” suggests, the Khmer refugee camp served as an exceptional testing ground for a
professional, political, and expert humanitarian sensibility.
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“Without Borders:” MSF’s Anti-Politics Politics
In reflections of its work during the Cold War period, MSF consistently focuses on the
political dimensions of its own work, rather than on the geopolitical implications of refugee
movement. In Cambodia, historian Michael Barnett writes, MSF first confronted the definitive
question: “would [they] be an organization that made noise and saved lives in the process, or an
organization that saved lives and occasionally made noise?”202 The inclusion of the 1980 image
of “témoignage" in MSF’s timeline indicates that the organization ultimately chose the former.
MSF’s historic and continued commitment to political action stems from a sense of legitimacy
gained via physical presence. Crisis, Redfield submits, is the “natural habitat for the moral
witness.”203 Through its work at the Thai-Khmer border, MSF acquired the power to give
testimony and to perform a political, as well as a humanitarian, function.
Espousing what Redfield terms a “nonideological ideology,” MSF presents itself as at
once overtly political and overwhelmingly humanitarian in focus.204 Overemphasis on political
objectives may have circumscribed MSF’s ability to access a crisis-stricken area like the Khmer
refugee camp. However, the organization’s willingness to engage in political messaging
differentiated it from existing international organizations like the ICRC, which maintains a
policy of neutrality and silence on political matters. MSF unites its two conflicting mandates in
an institutional commitment to independence and outspokenness. Meant to testify to MSF’s
revolutionary spirit, these pledges concurrently challenge and uphold conventional
representations of humanitarianism. Emphasis on outspokenness frames this principle as novel,
but reinforces the notion that in its normative form, humanitarianism should avoid the political
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realm. MSF’s dedication to independence manifests in the organization’s universalizing mission
to provide healthcare irrespective of geopolitical borders. Attractive in appearance, this principle
evokes of colonial policies which endowed the right to movement and independence to some
populations and stripped these possibilities from others.
In its very name, Médecins Sans Frontières projects a universal, modern image. A
rejection of political limits, of borders, is central to this humanitarian logic. In a short narrative
included on MSF’s website under the banner “Why We Started,” the NGO writes: “MSF was
created in the belief that all people should have access to healthcare regardless of gender, race,
religion, creed or political affiliation, and that people’s medical needs outweigh respect for
national boundaries.”205 This statement reaffirms the notion that national boundaries impede the
provision of humanitarian care, but portrays MSF as an organization to which these restrictions
do not apply. In this borderless world, the organization bears the responsibility of providing
some basic, universal standard of care.
This principle of action is reminiscent of one of the central claims of the civilizing
mission. A project that sought to indoctrinate the world in European, and later American, modes
of thinking, the civilizing mission emerged from the belief that a single, universal form of
civilization existed.206 MSF does not seek to be a new imperial power. Its self-conscious attempts
to recognize humanitarianism’s colonial ties make this clear. Nevertheless, in its articulation of a
humanitarian ideology, MSF makes some legacies of colonialism perceptible. MSF reconciles
the incongruities in its borderless ethos by emphasizing the medical and ethical imperatives of its
work. This mode of thinking and operating, crucial to MSF’s identity, creates a humanitarian
paradox. Like the American administration in the Philippine Islands, MSF is deliberate in its
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attempts to distinguish itself from earlier purveyors of humanitarian medicine. Emphasizing its
own performance as a young institution in Cambodia, MSF presents this experience as a
fundamental “turning point” that catalyzed the creation of an organization which now operates
around the world. MSF derives professional authority from its history of action, but at the same
time, promotes an image of humanitarianism as an apolitical, present-oriented tool of relief.
Practicing Politics on the Border
Today, MSF remains committed to providing healthcare to populations of refugees and
internally displaced persons. Descriptions of the organization’s current field activities
consistently reference its past practice. Speaking to a “long history of assisting and protecting
these populations,” MSF reiterates that its “roots were put down in the camps set up for
Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Afghan and Ethiopian refugees in the late ‘70s and ‘80s.”207 In
an entry on the website of MSF-India, this regional office declares that MSF has operated
specifically in Southeast Asia almost since its founding. It was here, the entry reads, that “[MSF]
established our first-ever large scale medical response to a refugee crisis.” Unsurprisingly, a
reference to care for “waves of Cambodians seeking sanctuary from the Khmer Rouge”
follows.208 Despite all this discussion of Cambodia, MSF shares relatively little about its actual
work – its practice – in Khmer refugee camps.
In his history of the field, Rony Brauman concludes that the Thai-Khmer border was “the
main place where humanitarian medical practice was redeveloped” in the 1980s. NGOs like MSF
experimented with and implemented new medical aid technologies in the camp setting.
According to Brauman, mobile field hospitals, such as that at Khao-I-Dang, health surveillance
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systems, water and sanitation technologies, and new radio communication structures became
“everyday tools for medical relief operations” during this time.209 As the caption of “Turning
Point” explains, the Cambodian experience revealed a need for logistical and programmatic
support in emergency situations (Figure 10). MSF’s accounts of its current work reflect these
lessons learned in the Cold War period. On the webpage entitled “How We Work,” for example,
MSF describes “logistics” as the “cornerstone” of its operations. Thousands of logisticians
deployed to field sites around the world ensure that MSF can effectively provide medical care, as
well as adequate food, clean water, sanitation, and shelter to populations in need. Teams of
logisticians, physicians, nurses, and other healthcare personnel also deliver treatment for noncommunicable diseases, provide mental health care, perform surgeries, and promote vaccination
campaigns. These projects embody the principles of humanitarian action presumably developed
on the Thai-Cambodian border, though the precise connection between work in Khmer camps
and modern practice is not made explicit.
MSF’s popular representations of Cambodia typically fail to mention an additional key
detail: the organization refused to work inside the country following a visit there in 1979.210 The
organization attached itself to the plight of Khmer refugees and provided essential healthcare
while advocating for political change. But it is crucial to note that MSF worked only on the Thai
side of the border and in specific refugee camps for political reasons. In Condemned to Repeat?
The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Fiona Terry considers emergency situations in the
twentieth century in which aid was weaponized and used in the continuation of conflict. Border
zones in Thailand housed hundreds of thousands of refugees, and Terry contends, also acted as a
buffer between Vietnamese-affiliated forces and Thailand and as bases for resistance fighters. In
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many camps, as in those that arose after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, victims and perpetrators
suddenly had to coexist in close quarters. Humanitarian aid often supported a war economy as
competing factions fought to control and divert relief supplies. According to Terry, international
humanitarian organizations felt it almost “impossible to avoid contributing to the war effort.”211
Agencies like MSF found themselves in a political bind.
For many organizations, the decision to continue work in and around Cambodia
presented an unappealing choice. Their work might support the Khmer Rouge, which had just
exterminated a staggering proportion of Cambodia’s population, or the Vietnamese, who
disrupted the genocide but remained in Cambodia as an army of occupation. Terry terms this
predicament a “crisis of Western conscience.”212 MSF was one of the few agencies that publicly
declared its loathing for both the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese regimes and refused to
participate in the system of payments required to work in Cambodia. The organization withdrew
its support from refugee camps with ties to the Khmer Rouge when the “emergency phase”
subsided but continued working in non-Khmer Rouge camps like Khao-I-Dang. A response to
this quandary, the “March for Survival” of Cambodia embodied MSF’s spirit of independence
and commitment to political outspokenness (Figure 10). Though it brought international attention
to Cambodia, this campaign further polarized the aid community. Contemporary representations
of the March suggest that the practice of humanitarian medicine along the Thai-Cambodian
border took place not just in refugee camps, but on the frontpages of newspapers around the
world.
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Searching for the Khmer Voice
For Médecins Sans Frontières, the Thai-Khmer refugee camp served as the testing ground
for a revolutionary humanitarian spirit. Through portrayals of its experience in Cambodia, MSF
has cultivated an institutional identity premised on technical and political expertise. The
organization encourages critical reflection and elevates internal voices of critique yet
characterizes its work in ways that, I argue, draw from the discourse of the civilizing mission. In
contemporary images and text, MSF represents the Cambodian refugee crisis as a success
narrative for the organization. Notably missing from this story, as well as much of this chapter, is
a Khmer voice.213 In 1995, as part of an oral history of Cambodians resettled in the United
States, an interviewer asked Samkhann Khoeum about his experience at Khao-I-Dang as a child.
The executive director of the Cambodian Mutual Assistance Association in Lowell,
Massachusetts at the time, Khoeum responded:
The word I would use to describe the camp is that it was like a prison. We were
surrounded by barbed wire, two or three layers of barbed wire, and we were guarded by
Thai soldiers. Anyone who dared to cross the barbed wire [fence] would be subject to
death; they were killed.214
MSF references the atrocities of genocide in their website captions but does not comment
on the camp conditions in which they worked. This ignores Khmer perspectives like Khoeum’s.
Though they are experts in refugee health, MSF circumscribes the ability of refugees to narrate
their own experiences of the refugee camp. As a prominent voice in a field which suffers from
chronic historical amnesia, MSF reveals one of the major dilemmas of humanitarian medicine.
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Like the American colonial government in the Philippines, MSF shows the practice of
humanitarian medicine to be more about the practitioners than the recipients of aid. Erasure was
seemingly the cost of expertise. At Khao-I-Dang, MSF participated in a wider “community of
practice” made up of internationally recognized relief agencies.215 This suggests that MSF’s
iteration of humanitarianism may illuminate broader trends in the policy and practice of aid
during this period. The case study presented in the final chapter – a disaster situation in which
MSF also worked – reveals that humanitarian actors continued to confront many of these same
issues long-after the era of the Cold War was supplanted by the age of Liberal Humanitarianism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“Build Back Better”:
The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Provision and Performance of Care in
Indonesia
Banda Aceh, Aceh, Indonesia, 2004
An “Unprecedented” Disaster and An Unprecedented Response?
In the early morning hours of December 26, 2004, an earthquake registering 9.0 on the
Richter scale struck off the west coast of Northern Sumatra. The ground shook for nearly five
minutes on Banda Aceh, the Indonesian city closest to the epicenter of the undersea quake.216
The force of this tectonic shift triggered a string of tsunami waves that soon engulfed nations
around the Indian Ocean Basin. One of the deadliest disasters in recorded history, the Indian
Ocean Tsunami, also known in the West as the Boxing Day Tsunami, violently claimed lives and
livelihoods in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, India, Singapore, Malaysia,
Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, and the Seychelles. The combined effects of the earthquake and
tsunami killed over 220,000 people and displaced over 1.1 million others.217 Indonesia was home
to nearly seventy percent of these casualties. Towering black waves inundated the coast of
Indonesia’s westernmost province, Aceh, just twenty minutes after the initial earthquake. In the
aftermath, officials declared 163,000 to 170,000 people dead or missing.218 Banda Aceh, the
capital of Aceh Province and largest major city affected in the archipelago, quickly became a
focal point of relief coordination. Between the city and surrounding villages, the tsunami left
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500,000 survivors without homes and 750,000 without livelihoods.219 The waves razed 50-70%
of all regional health facilities and killed staggering numbers of trained healthcare workers, city
officials, and village leaders. Lacking access to shelter and sanitation, injured survivors were at
imminent risk of suffering from a communicable disease outbreak.220 Indonesian President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono recognized a need for rapid action and called for international
emergency humanitarian assistance.221 On December 28, 2004, Aceh Province officially opened
to the international community, albeit conditionally, for the first time in the twenty-first
century.222
Within one week of President Yudhoyono’s declaration, representatives from nearly 50
international organizations arrived in Aceh province to offer their assistance. By mid-January
2005, over 200 organizations were active in the region.223 These figures do not account for
groups involved in tsunami relief in the eleven other affected countries but reveal the speed and
scale at which the international humanitarian community responded to crisis in Indonesia. In the
early months of 2005, influxes of material and economic aid to Indonesia reached
“unprecedented” levels.224 Scholars refer to this overwhelming outpouring of aid as a “second
tsunami” that both facilitated and complicated recovery.225 Representatives from small faithbased charities, medical NGOs like MSF, national governments, the UN, and global
development agencies descended upon Aceh in what archaeologist and anthropologist Patrick
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Daly deems one of “the largest and most globalized post-disaster reconstruction efforts in
history.”226 Chief among these early responders was the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), the self-proclaimed “chief USG [U.S. Government] responder to
international disasters and crises.”227
Hours after receiving reports of the tsunami, USAID deployed a 21-member Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) to assess need in affected areas and to provide immediate
sanitation and health relief supplies.228 The following day, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
announced that the U.S. would contribute $15 million to relief and recovery efforts. President
George W. Bush increased this pledge to $950 million by February 9, 2005.229 In the interim, the
U.S. dispatched the largest military contingent of any foreign government to the disaster zone to
help transport humanitarian supplies.230 Former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton
concurrently announced a domestic fundraising effort and urged American citizens to contribute
to the relief effort from home.231 American civilians raised nearly $566 million for tsunami relief
in the first months of 2005.232 When asked about this striking response, former President Clinton
replied:
When you see families torn apart by this tragedy, and people desperately trying to rebuild
schools and places of work and worship, then you realize that, despite our differences, we
are bound together by our common humanity, and we all have an obligation to help the
victims of the tsunami have the blessings of a normal life.233
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Appealing to the discourse of “common humanity,” Clinton framed American tsunami
relief as an issue of humanitarian concern above all else. He stated that the primary objective of
reconstruction was a return to “normal” life for tsunami victims. With the invocation of
universalizing concepts such as shared humanity and normalcy, Clinton raised many of the core
questions that this project has asked of humanitarianism. Consequently, this chapter must ask: to
what extent did the American response to disaster in Indonesia rely on “seductively simplistic”
visions of humanitarianism?
This chapter will take a critical look at USAID’s response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami
in Aceh Province. The American government’s swift and outsize response to this crisis makes
clear the magnitude of destruction left in the tsunami’s wake. Leaders of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declared on January 6, 2005 that “this unprecedented
devastation need[ed] unprecedented global response.”234 There is truth in the assumption that
unparalleled devastation prompted extraordinary humanitarian action. I do not seek to trivialize
the real and meaningful ways that humanitarian actors served those who were in danger or
suffering. Rather, as in the previous two case studies, I aim to complicate narratives of
humanitarian exceptionalism. This research challenges the notion that the outpouring of aid in
2004-2005 was entirely “unprecedented” and without strings attached.
Borrowing Warwick Anderson’s concept of the “laboratory” once again, I argue that the
disaster-zone in Indonesia emerged as a novel testing ground for humanitarian rhetoric and
practice in the post-Cold War age of Liberal Humanitarianism. As I discussed in previous
chapters, crisis often creates a “narrative turning point.” 235 For the colonial U.S. government in
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the Philippine Islands and MSF on the Thai-Cambodian border, disease and displacement
presented opportunities to construct new humanitarian identities. In the aftermath of the U.S.’s
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, disaster in Indonesia offered USAID the chance to
perform humanitarian ideals such as benevolence, generosity, and expertise on a global scale.
Rhetoric from this period reveals that USAID cultivated a particular narrative of its role in
tsunami relief effort that deflected attention from the U.S. government to the American people. It
was crucial that American expressions of compassion, measured in monetary pledges and aid
personnel deployed to Indonesia, came from ordinary citizens and were visible to the
international community. In practice, USAID undertook rehabilitation operations under the
popular slogan “build back better.” A cornerstone of the Agency’s mission in Aceh, this notion,
however well-intentioned, conjures paternalistic sentiments of imposition and universal visions
of progress.236 In exploring these two facets of USAID’s response in Indonesia, this chapter will
bring together many of the themes and continuities made visible in histories of humanitarianism
across the long twentieth century.
Historicizing Vulnerability: Aceh Province in the Twentieth Century
The Sumatra-Andaman earthquake which precipitated the Indian Ocean Tsunami was the
largest recorded earthquake anywhere in the world in nearly forty years. The Pacific Tsunami
Monitoring System based in Honolulu, Hawaii registered the quake within one hour of its
rupture but lacked functional communication infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region. Efforts to
warn affected countries about impending tsunamis were unsuccessful, leaving scores of states
and people unprepared for disaster.237 The magnitude of this catastrophe certainly required a
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massive relief effort. But, as the previous two case studies demonstrate, disaster, whether natural
or human-made, never occurs in a vacuum. Crises emerge in particular historical moments, and
consequent societal dislocation and humanitarian relief must be understood in context. In Aceh,
professor of refugee studies Jennifer Hyndman asserts, the tsunami “was but one more layer of
politicized devastation” in a region already affected by violent conflict and structural
inequities.238 Thus, to grasp why the tsunami elicited the response that it did in Aceh, it is crucial
to examine the history of the region in the decades prior.
In December 2004, Aceh was among the poorest and most politically fraught provinces in
Indonesia. Eighteen months before the tsunami struck, the Indonesian government had declared a
state of emergency in Aceh, effectively placing this northwestern state of Sumatra under martial
law.239 This declaration was an outgrowth of decades-long armed conflict between the
Indonesian government based in Jakarta and the Free Aceh Movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
(GAM). Founded in 1976 by Acehnese businessman Hasan di Tiro, GAM espoused a religious
and ethno-nationalist ideology. The group, which officially remained an active political
organization until 2005, fought for independence and control over the region’s rich natural
resources.240 Acehnese natural gas and oil responsories constituted huge sources of revenue for
the Indonesian government and political elite in Jakarta.241 Little wealth remained in Aceh, a
territory distinguished by its orthodox practice of Islam and extensive history of separatist
conflict. Dutch forces struggled fiercely to bring Aceh into the colonial empire of the
Netherlands East Indies in the nineteenth century, and did not attempt to invade again after the
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Japanese occupation of the Second World War.242 In the 1940s and 1950s, Acehnese leaders
chafed against the newly independent Indonesian government’s efforts to incorporate the region
in a centralized, secular state.243 Cold War politics only compounded these issues. Western
democracies, such as the United States, tacitly supported the Indonesian government and military
as these increasingly inextricable bodies perpetrated genocide against political dissidents and
strengthened their hold on the archipelago.244 For Aceh and other territories harboring
autonomous designs, this rapid consolidation of power precipitated years of repressive rule and
violent insurgency.
In the three decades leading up to the tsunami, conflict between GAM and the central
government left Aceh vulnerable to disaster. After a series of attacks by GAM in 1989-1990, the
Indonesian government declared Aceh a ‘Military Operations Area,’ paving the way for further
military intervention. The government formally rescinded this designation in 1998, though
violence broke out in sporadic episodes until 2005.245 This cycle of separatist conflict and
military confrontation, rife with human rights abuses on both sides, ultimately killed 15,000 to
20,000 people and displaced over 400,000.246 When the tsunami inundated the Acehnese coast in
2004, it brought into stark focus the consequences of prolonged armed struggle, inequitable
economic development, and regional deprivation. An economic system based on natural resource
extraction meant that most wealth generated locally left in the form of exports. Central
government involvement in Aceh, Indonesia’s only province governed by sharia law, was limited
to military and security operations. Conflict had sown deep distrust between many local residents
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and Indonesian national authorities. Most state interaction went through village leaders, many of
whom were lost in the tsunami.247 Additionally, in response to earlier outcry over human rights
issues, the Indonesian government effectively had closed Aceh to international aid workers, save
a limited group of representatives from the ICRC, the UN, and other small NGOs.248 For these
reasons, the tsunami constituted what Hyndman terms a “dual disaster.”249
The Indian Ocean Tsunami swept through a province ill-equipped to stand up an
emergency response. Both the Indonesian government and international community quickly
recognized the precarity of Aceh’s situation. Surya Paloh, an Indonesian national who organized
a private relief effort, told a Washington Post reporter at the time: “There is no sense of
emergency and of how to respond quickly and effectively.” The reporter, Ellen Nakashima,
remarked that the government was “hardly functioning,” and could barely complete the task of
identifying and burying corpses.250 Disease, coupled with the lack of shelter, food, and
sanitation, threatened Aceh’s surviving population. Cognizant of these dangers and the optics of
a bungled emergency response, President Yudhoyono, elected less than 100 days prior,
welcomed foreign assistance.
Yudhoyono, who received military training in the U.S., made clear that his invitation was
limited to disaster response and would expire after the immediate relief phase.251 With this
solicitation, Yudhoyono’s government both secured essential aid and capitalized on a distinct
opportunity. Disaster disrupted preexisting political dynamics in Aceh; it created space for new
international, as well as domestic, actors to intervene in the province in that were previously
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untenable. A successful relief program in Aceh could rehabilitate the central government’s image
and pave the path to future peace. Remarking on the importance of an effective response,
Yudhoyono’s coordinating minister for social welfare Alwi Shihab said of his president: “This is
a test case for him.”252

“Can American Rice Trump American Guns Across the Muslim World?”253

Figure 11. Crew of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln load USAID donations of food and water
for delivery to northern Sumatra on January 6, 2005.254
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Much like their Indonesian counterparts, U.S. government officials recognized the
immense need and opportunity that arose in the tsunami’s wake. In addition to providing crucial
aid, an effective American response had great political implications. As with the previous two
case studies, it is crucial to situate this disaster and humanitarian response in the longer
geopolitical history of the period. In 2004, Indonesian and American relations had fallen into a
state of disrepair. During the Cold War, U.S. administrations had worked closely with that of
President Suharto, the autocratic military leader who led Indonesia from 1967 to 1998. Fearful
that Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, would fall to communism, the U.S.
government stayed silent for years as Suharto’s regime grew repressive and even genocidal. In
the 1990s, the Cold War coming to a close, recurrent human rights violations perpetrated by the
Indonesian military strained diplomatic dealings between the two nations.
In Aceh, the Indonesian government’s campaigns to reconsolidate power in Jakarta
spurred conflict between separatist forces and the central government. East Timor, a former
Portuguese colony in the center of the Indonesian archipelago, experienced similar levels of civil
unrest. An primarily Catholic region in a predominantly Muslim nation, East Timor, now the
sovereign state of Timor-Leste, called for independence after centuries of Portuguese rule ended
in 1975.255 Consequent clashes between the Indonesian government and East Timorese
separatists were deadly and garnered increasing international infamy in the 1980s and 1990s.
The U.S. government first halted the provision of military assistance to Indonesia in 1992
over reports that Indonesian forces had killed scores of East Timorese protestors.256 President
B.J. Habibie, Suharto’s successor and the first Indonesian leader to organize truly free elections
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since the 1950s, held a UN referendum on East Timor in August 1999. After 78.5 percent of East
Timorese voted for independence, Indonesian militias retaliated brutally, killing at least 1,300
civilians. In response, the U.S. again suspended military assistance programs and threatened to
sever formal ties with Jakarta.257 These restrictions were still in place in 2004.
The tsunami, which occurred less than one year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, created an
opening. Using humanitarian channels, the American government had the chance to re-warm
relations with Indonesian leadership and to send a larger message. In responding to catastrophe
in the world’s most populous Muslim nation with compassion and care, the United States sought
to repair its image tarnished in Iraq. During his visit to Jakarta in the early days of January 2005,
then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell explained that the U.S. aid effort provided “an
opportunity to see American generosity [and] American values in action.” This response would
demonstrate that the U.S., and notably the U.S. military, was “not an anti-Islamic, anti-Muslim
nation.” Additionally, as Powell pointed out, effective disaster response intended to “dr[y] up
those pools of dissatisfaction that might give rise to terrorist activity.”258 Journalists such as Neil
King Jr. aptly noted that this response would “display a softer side to America’s massive
military,” and would demonstrate that U.S. foreign policy was not solely focused on combatting
terrorism as it had been in the years since 9/11 (Figure 11).259 Entering this complex web of
political performance, USAID arrived in the Aceh disaster-zone with a dual mandate: to provide
aid and to reaffirm the status of the U.S. as benevolent global hegemon.
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The Politics of USAID
It is also an opportunity for America to demonstrate our generosity and compassion, and for us
to show that USAID is this country’s and the world’s most capable foreign aid organization.
— Andrew S. Natsios, Frontlines (January 2005)260
In the December 2004 edition of USAID’s internal employee newsletter, head of the
Agency Andrew S. Natsios called on all offices and staff to join the tsunami relief effort. As the
epigraph above suggests, USAID was the primary vehicle through which the American
government intended to send a message about crisis in Indonesia. USAID, an independent
agency of the U.S. federal government, had been a major actor in American intervention
overseas since its official charter in 1961. Born from the legacy of the Marshall Plan, which
disbursed American aid to Western European states after World War II, USAID proclaimed itself
in 2006 the “principle U.S. agency providing assistance to countries recovering from disaster,
trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.”261 In other words, the Agency
was, and continues to be, an agent of humanitarianism, international development, and American
foreign policy. Many USAID documents recognize this aspect of the organization’s mission,
clearly stating that emergency teams intervene when “it is in the interest of the USG to
respond.”262 The basis of this interest changed repeatedly in the nearly half-century between
USAID’s creation and the Indian Ocean Tsunami. These changes are most visible in the
Agency’s rhetoric, namely in self-published institutional profiles. The Agency initially focused
on injecting U.S. development dollars into foreign economies to curb the spread of communism
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but pivoted to a “basic needs” model with greater emphasis on health, education, and income
generation in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the era of Liberal Humanitarianism, a “sustainable
development” model prevailed. This shift opened many new dialogues about the merits of selfsustaining programs in global health, good governance, and economic progress.263
After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan, USAID placed a new emphasis on national security in its programming. USAID
and the U.S. State Department issued their first joint strategic plan for 2004-2009, which
dedicated greater attention to projects in failing states.264 The Agency was divided into four
regional and three technical bureaus at the time. The Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarianism Assistance (DCHA) is the department of greatest relevance to this research, as
it housed the managing body of USAID’s tsunami response, the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA). In both name and objective, this Bureau bears a striking resemblance to
Cold War aid campaigns designed to target “hearts and minds.”
A shift in visual rhetoric accompanied USAID’s addendum to its mission in the early
2000s. In conjunction with a new emphasis on national security, the Agency reinvested in its
global brand strategy. Clasped hands, assumed to be a universal symbol of friendship and unity,
had long been at the center of USAID’s logo. According to Eleanor Gault, a marketing employee
in a predecessor agency in the 1950s, this image was a way to “identify aid as part of the mutual
effort with mutual benefits shared by our country [the U.S.] and friends around the world.”265
Just months before the tsunami in Aceh, USAID added a new slogan beneath this logo: “From
the American People” (Figure 12). The authors of a 2006 USAID primer entitled “What We Do
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and How We Do It” explained that this change ensured the U.S. government and American
taxpayer would receive recognition for their contributions to relief work abroad.266 This
rhetorical shift, executed in visual and narrative forms, added a personal dimension to USAID’s
work. This new phrase distanced USAID from the U.S. federal government and reframed it as an
extension of the American public. USAID strengthened the affective appeal of their
programming in evoking the same sentiment of “common humanity” that former President Bill
Clinton described in a passage at the start of this chapter. With this strategy, the Agency
portrayed itself, an organization awash in the history of American politics, in the honeyed light
of humanitarianism.

Figure 12. USAID global brand heritage 1948-2004.267

Performing Compassion on a Global Stage
Disaster in Indonesia presented USAID an opportunity to construct a new narrative about
American altruism in the twenty-first century. In its response to destruction in Aceh, the Agency
depicted itself as both an exemplar of humanitarian virtue and a global humanitarian leader.
USAID made massive material contributions to the relief effort in Aceh. After an initial pledge
of approximately $25 million, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) ultimately
worked with other U.S. government agencies to channel nearly $400 million in emergency aid to
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the province.268 Much of the infrastructure in Aceh, and a significant portion of the local
workforce, was lost in the tsunami. Early projects focused on filling this void and providing
immediate access to food, water, shelter, and medicine. USAID stationed temporary staff at the
main hospital in Banda Aceh and dispatched over 100 mobile teams to provide primary
healthcare and psycho-social programming in the region. Coupled with rapid efforts to
rehabilitate sanitation and sewage facilities, USAID’s efforts “dramatically reduced post-tsunami
health risks.” An official one-year retrospective report concluded that at least 600,000 people
affected by the tsunami “benefitted” from Agency care.269 Describing its own efforts during the
emergency phase in Aceh, USAID actors consistently emphasized the larger significance of their
work. In the words of scholar of communication Jeff Motter, the U.S. tsunami relief effort was
“as much a rhetorical moment as a material act.”270 Aid served as the material manifestation of
American compassion and generosity. It was crucial that the U.S. not only provided effective
care, but also, as Administrator Natsios’ rallying cry illustrates, that the world noticed. In this
sense, USAID’s representation of their work in Aceh mirrors that of MSF on the ThaiCambodian Border twenty years earlier. Public representations of each groups’ work centered
humanitarian actors rather than the populations in need, suggesting that the performance of care
was nearly as important as the provision of it.
The concept of expertise also played a central role in USAID’s intervention in Aceh.
Administrator Natsios determined that the disaster-zone is Indonesia granted USAID a chance to
reaffirm its status as “the world’s most capable foreign organization.” During the emergency
phase, for example, USAID proudly advertised that its Disaster Assistance Response Teams

268

USAID: Indonesia, Emergency Response and Reconstruction in Aceh Province (2004-2009), 1.
USAID, USAID fact sheet: Tsunami assistance, one year later, December 21, 2005, pdf,
https://reliefweb.int/report/india/usaid-fact-sheet-tsunami-assistance-one-year-later.
270
Motter, “American Exceptionalism and the Rhetoric of Humanitarian Militarism,” 508.
269

113

(DART) had collected baseline data for the entire humanitarian community to use in assessing
the impact of relief and recovery programs.271 As the magnitude of disaster became clear, the
Agency quickly supplemented its emergency relief programs with long-term plans. The authors
of the Agency’s Primer, revised shortly after the tsunami in 2006, explain that “USAID’s broad
experience in disaster aid permits effective, well-targeted responses to needs for immediate
assessment and relief as well as for long-term reconstruction and strengthening local capacity to
deal with disaster.”272 “Cash-for-work” and livelihood programs, which paid survivors to help
clean and rebuild in Aceh, served as a testament to this foresight. Employment initiatives, in
theory, added an appealing dimension to American disaster response. Descriptions of this work
emphasized the restoration of “self-reliance.”273 OFDA, in the words of USAID employee Fiona
Shanks, favored long-term solutions “that drew upon and strengthened local resources and
tapped into nascent civil society groups rather than supplanting them.”274 Attempting to dismiss
implications of imposition, USAID framed their work in Aceh as a collaborative endeavor meant
to avoid protracted dependency on humanitarian aid. This sentiment, discussed in language
reminiscent of that of MSF and even the American government in the Philippines, suggests that
USAID actors were careful to avoid constructing an overtly paternalistic aid system.
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The Practice of Aid in Aceh: What is “Lost in Translation”?

Figure 13. “#BuildBackBetter.” The U.S. Embassy in Indonesia curated a photo exhibition in Jakarta
and released an accompanying website, pictured here, to commemorate stories of “resilience, recovery,
and international solidarity” ten years after the 2004 tsunami.275

USAID exhibited self-awareness about its position in Indonesia as an external aid
organization but struggled to translate this recognition into practice. Shortly after December 26,
2004, USAID announced its plan to embark on a multi-year recovery effort to help Aceh “build
back better” (Figure 13).276 This popular refrain soon became the guiding principle of long-term
action in the disaster zone. During a visit with the U.N. Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery,
former President Bill Clinton explained that “We,” meaning the American humanitarian
apparatus, “need to make sure that this recovery process accomplishes more than just restoring
what there was before.”277 Like most humanitarian endeavors, this plan was surely wellintentioned. Yet, the notion of building back “better” raises a host of complicated questions. In a
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devasted landscape teeming with foreign actors, who defines what is “better?” And what does
this imply in terms of actionable policies?
USAID’s post-disaster reconstruction plan focused on four key areas: rebuilding key
infrastructure, restoring livelihoods, providing basic needs and services for the vulnerable, and
the strengthening capacity of local government. The Agency provided technical assistance to
reconstruct houses and roads and developed income generation programs for Acehnese farmers.
USAID’s Environmental Services and Health Services Program helped revitalize health
infrastructure with a special emphasis on expanding networks for maternal and pediatric care. In
Aceh’s districts, USAID’s Decentralized Basic Education Program “improved the quality of
teaching and learning.” Partnering with local organizations, USAID also established the first
women’s crisis center in Aceh to offer gender sensitivity training to Islamic court judges,
religious leaders, and local legal scholars.278 These programs promoted development across
many sectors. They invited women and youth, for example, to participate more fully in
conversations about Aceh’s path forward. Ideally, successful investment in a moment of great
dislocation would reduce the need for emergency relief in future crises. For many Western
humanitarian actors, as well as American citizens, these policies appeared unquestionably good.
These programs likely had meaningful, positive impacts in some sectors and may have
been less influential in others. Notably missing in many accounts of this work is great detail
about the actual processes of construction or provision of medical aid. In this way, USAID’s
institutional recollection of its intervention echoes that of MSF in Chapter Three. For these
organizations, remembering the practice of aid is primarily a narrative device, and one that
supports a humanitarian identity in the present. This research does not seek to label USAID’s
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work as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ successful, or unsuccessful. Rather, it aims to illuminate the historical
subtext of a charge to “build back better.” The foci of USAID’s programming in Aceh indicates
that these American humanitarian actors defined “better” in terms they assumed to be universal.
The government of Aceh did not use this language in their own framing of disaster response.279
Lilianne Fan, a research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute, explains that “build back
better” was most popular among non-Acehnese actors involved in tsunami recovery. Better, Fan
notes, also had clearly different connotations than safer.280 A rhetorical, as well as practical
device, “build back better” embodies a perennial challenge humanitarian responders face.
USAID articulated its program in Aceh as one that privileged local input in long-term planning.
At the same time, the Agency assumed it knew best, or at least “better.” It deployed programs
developed from a Western perspective that promoted supposedly universal values. To “build
back better,” in this view, was to build back more American.
“From the American People”
The Indian Ocean Tsunami transformed the devasted landscape of Aceh Province into a
testing ground for USAID’s ethics of humanitarianism. The Agency’s ability to assemble and
execute an effective emergency response had implications that extended far beyond the bounds
of the Indonesian archipelago. Recent American actions in Iraq had stained the U.S.’s global
reputation. USAID, an extension of the federal government framed as a representative of the
“American people,” was tasked with repairing this damaged image. Through their provision of
aid, USAID actors intended to show the world that the United States was still a benevolent force.
Humanitarianism, with its present-orientation and conations of compassion, served as an
excellent instrument in this endeavor. USAID programming, in theory, exemplified American
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generosity as well as operational capability. Practically, USAID policies developed under the
mandate of “build back better” reinforced the idea that American values were universal, and that
their purveyors were expert, if not paternalistic, agents of modern humanitarianism.
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EPILOGUE
USAID’s mission in the twenty-first century replicated the structures, assumptions, and
challenges of humanitarian interventions of earlier eras. Like the American colonial government
in the 1900s or MSF in the 1980s, USAID approached humanitarianism as both a set of
philosophical principles and a political tool. Many USAID officials in Indonesia recognized this
dual function yet continued to construct narratives of humanitarian exceptionalism.
Overemphasis on human need and purely compassionate response minimized the complexity of
the historical and geopolitical context in which disaster response occurred. Phrases such as
“build back better” centered USAID’s relief effort in the present while offering commentary on
the past and the future. To be “better” implies that the past was problematic and the future an
opportunity for improvement on humanitarian rather, than overtly political, grounds. With this
slogan, USAID tapped into a discourse of modernity that, I argue, is rooted in late nineteenth
century theories of civilizing. But, as Lilianne Fan critically asks in her analysis of post-tsunami
reconstruction in Aceh, “who would want to build back worse”?281
This study began with the question: is humanitarianism in the twentieth century a
continuation of the civilizing mission? To answer concisely: yes and no. First, it is crucial to
acknowledge that there is no single humanitarianism of the twentieth century. Rather, there are
many humanitarianisms and they exist in a myriad of dynamic forms. Separated by decades and
volumes of history, the cases considered here are unique. They deal with vastly different time
periods, distinct institutions, and specific crises of diverse natures. This research challenges
“seductively simplistic” visions of humanitarianism to expose the consequences of excessive
generalization. Friction, as the opening case study in Sulawesi illustrated, arises when
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humanitarian actors presume that their values, practices, and presence are welcome in any
context. However, it would also be inappropriate to conclude that all humanitarian action stems
from antiquated desires to civilize or “uplift.” This research shows that to understand tension in
the present, we have to study humanitarian narratives and action in context. I raise questions
about the links between contemporary and colonial expressions of humanitarianism not to
condemn or criticize humanitarianism, but to see how overgeneralization and oversimplification
create gaps in knowledge that are both mystifying and controversial.
The civilizing mission, as the preceding chapters have discussed, promised progress
through access to modern culture, science, and technology. This notion – that progress can be
defined in universal, Western terms – is one of the key threads that runs through the case studies
surveyed here. An assumption of superiority often accompanied this idea but was increasingly
veiled in the language of expertise and technological prowess as the twentieth century went on.
The conviction that humanitarianism, assumed to be a symbol of what is good and moral, was an
appropriate vehicle for political intervention also endured. This last assumption often reoriented
the focus of humanitarian action to the humanitarian institution or actor themselves. In this way,
narratives of humanitarian history preserve some of the central features of Edward Said’s
orientalism. Humanitarian discourse, this research indicates, arguably tells us more about the
international humanitarian imagination than it does about populations served or details of
medical work on the ground.
I now return to Lilianne Fan’s striking question. In an attempt to avoid the paternalistic
pitfalls of humanitarian tradition, should aid workers in Aceh have committed to “building back
worse?” Should they have devoted their time to reproducing structures of inequality and
vulnerability? Fan’s query, as well as the multitude of questions it raises, is likely unanswerable.
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Instead, it invites further consideration about the limitations and future of humanitarianism. The
case studies included here illuminate an unsavory side of aid. It is political and has been
throughout the twentieth century. In light of this recognition, the Indonesian government’s
actions in Sulawesi in 2018 appear unsurprising. Humanitarian discourses are often premised on
the belief that superior science and technology endow certain institutions and individuals the
right to direct others. These patterns and incongruities in humanitarian discourse and practice are
critical to address. But how do we do this? How do we disassemble and reconstruct an
international system characterized by uneven distribution of wealth and resources? Should all
global health projects with echoes of the civilizing mission be terminated? Should health funding
flows, between Western nations and previously dependent territories, for example, stop? I raise
these questions here not to attempt to answer them, but to show what a historical approach
allows us to ask. As the opening case in Sulawesi, as well as each subsequent chapter, revealed,
history is very much alive in humanitarian spaces. Acknowledging this truth, and the discomfort
that may accompany it, offers both scholars and humanitarians a way forward, an opportunity to
see through the haze of the “humanitarian mystique.”
In the spirit of studying context-specific humanitarianisms, I cannot conclude without
addressing the historical context in which I completed the final stages of this research. In the
spring of 2020, we are living in the midst of a global public health crisis of extraordinary
proportions. Every day we watch human tragedies and political dramas play out across the news.
In the United States, we have a front row seat to see how not just aid, but medicine and scientific
knowledge become issues of immense political importance. We see — in daily press briefings —
how crisis becomes an opportunity to construct new narratives. Some are frightening, some
inspiring, and some just surprising. We watch as patterns of chronic inequity poke through the
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wreckage of COVID-19, and we weather challenges to long-held beliefs about the preparedness
and adaptability of our modern health systems. We are living in a moment of great uncertainty,
but this research suggests, we can be certain of one thing: medicine and politics are and have
been deeply interconnected. Acknowledging this truth does not make the work of frontline
healthcare workers, or humanitarian actors throughout history, any less crucial or laudable. We
must recognize and honor the sacrifices that people make in service of others, or as President
Clinton said in 2005, in service of “our common humanity.” But, as my research shows, we can
do this in ways that acknowledge the histories and politics, and the histories of politics, that
shape the world we live in.
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